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INTRODUCTION

While Article III of the Constitution' provides Congress
with the power to create lower federal courts, 2 its terms do not
require their creation. Though there has been some controversy
as to the extent of the congressional power that flows from this
provision, 3 it has generally been accepted that Congress may
adjust the jurisdiction of the federal courts in virtually any
manner. 4 Included in this congressional power is the implied
1 "The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
2 When speaking of "lower federal courts" this Article primarily refers to the United
States District Courts, created by Congress under the power granted by article III, § 1 of
the Constitution. Although the various United States Circuit Courts of Appeals are also
"lower federal courts," the focus of this Article is on the withdrawal by Congress of the
jurisdiction of a federal court to hear in the first instance a suit contesting the constitutionality of a federal statute. The congressional withdrawal of jurisdiction over such a
claim would prevent the court of appeals from hearing an appeal on the merits. See 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
This Article does not address the question of congressional control of Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction. That question has been commented on frequently and is
beyond the scope of this analysis. For a discussion of that problem, see R. BERGER,
CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969); Ratner, CongressionalPower over the Appellate
Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960).
' See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 330-31 (1816) (dictum);
Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1949); Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd
on other grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972); Murray v.
Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.I. 1969); Eisenberg, CongressionalAuthority to Restrict
Lower4 Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974).
See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1973); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530, 551 (1962) (dictum); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Lockerty
v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); B5rs v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252 (1884); United States v.
Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569 (1878); Sewing Machine Co. Case, 85 U.S. 553 (1873);
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.)
441 (1850); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812); Ratner, supra note 2,
at 158; Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARV: L.
REV. 49, 68-69 (1923); Note, The Constitutional Implications of the JurisdictionalAmount
Provisionin InjunctionSuits Against Federal Officers, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1474 (1971).
Congress has succeeded at various times in the past in removing jurisdiction of
federal courts over certain matters. See generally Nagel, Court-CurbingPeriods in American
History, 18 VAND. L. REV. 925 (1965). Members of Congress often attempt to do so by
introducing various bills curbing the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See P. BATOR, P.
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 360-65 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]. A
few examples will illustrate the problem and place it in historical perspective.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act's restriction on the authority of the federal courts to issue
a restraining order or a temporary or permanent injunction in any case "involving or
growing out of a labor dispute," 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1970), and providing that "yellow dog"
contracts "shall not be enforceable in any court of the United States," 29 U.S.C. § 110
(1970), was upheld in Lauf v. E.G. Shinner, Inc., 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
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authority to withdraw jurisdiction completely.5 That is, since
Congress possesses discretionary power to create lower federal
courts, it must also be empowered to abolish them. If Congress
may literally abolish such courts, then it must also necessarily be
able effectively to "abolish" them in more limited ways by withdrawing their jurisdiction over particular subject matters. 6
This traditional view of unfettered discretionary power to
eliminate lower federal court jurisdiction finds its genesis in the
debates of the Constitutional Convention. 7 On the assumption
that the state courts would be open to hear all federal claims, the
framers reached a compromise drafting of article III which
awarded Congress the option of choosing whether or not to
create lower federal courts. 8 Some thirty years after this event
Ten years later, Congress passed the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 which
created the "Emergency Court of Appeals." Act ofJan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23. This
court was given exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any regulation or order
issued pursuant to the Act. Section 204(d) of the Act-which provided that no other
court, federal, state, or territorial, would have jurisdiction to decide the validity of any
regulation or to enjoin any provision of the Act authorizing the issuance of such a
regulation-was held constitutional in Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); see HART
& WECHSLER, supra, at 319-22; Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 524-25. See also Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
Additional such examples can be found in the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 216, 251-62 (1970); cf. HART & WECHSLER, supra, at 322-24, the Health Programs Extension Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (Supp. III, 1973), and the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1652d (Supp. 1975); see Note, CongressionalPower
over State and FederalCourt Jurisdiction:The Hill-Burton and Trans-Alaska Pipeline Examples,
49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 131 (1974). For two unsuccessful attempts by the Nixon Administration, see Goldberg, The Administration's Anti-Busing Proposals-PoliticsMakes Bad Law, 67
Nw. U.L. REv. 319 (1972); Note, The Nixon Busing Bills and CongressionalPower, 81 YALE
L.J. 1542 (1972).
" See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260
U.S. 226, 234 (1922); Gordon v. United States, 74 U.S. 188 (1868); Sheldon v. Sill, 49
U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850); HART & WEcHsLER, supra note 4, at 12; Ratner, supra note 2, at
158; text accompanying notes 53-57 infra.
6 It is important to note that despite Congress' apparent power to withdraw jurisdiction completely, there do appear to exist certain accepted limitations. For example, although Congress may withdraw jurisdiction completely, once it vests in the federal courts
the jurisdiction to hear a case it cannot tell the court how to decide the case. United States
v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872); cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 460
(1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Nor could Congress, we presume, successfully employ
its article III power to direct that no Jews or Catholics bring their cases to federal court.
The present Article deals primarily with hypotheticals in which Congress has completely
removed lower federal court jurisdiction.
7See text accompanying notes 29-52 infra.
8 G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, CASES & MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 58 (8th
ed. 1970). See also C. McGOWAN, THE ORGANIZATION OF JUDICIAL POwER IN THE
UNITED STATES 18-20 (1969) (1967 Julius Rosenthal Lecture, Nortwestern University
School of Law). Hereinafter, this compromise formulation of article III and the rationale
behind it will be referred to as the "Madisonian Compromise." Although introduced by
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the Supreme Court inferred from the drafting of article III
congressional power to limit the jurisdiction of lower federal
courts to less than the maximum judicial power permitted in
article 111. 9
Though widely accepted, this general view has not been
universally adopted. Some courts' 0 and commentators" have insisted that congressional power over lower federal court jurisdiction is not absolute and have offered competing theories of the
extent of Congress' power. Early in the nation's history, for example, Justice Joseph Story maintained that article III gave
Congress no discretionary control whatsoever. 2 Rather, he asserted, article III required that all national judicial power be
vested in the federal courts.' 3
More recently, several other theories have been advanced by
various courts 1 4 and commentators 5 to justify varying forms of
both James Madison and James Wilson and conceived by John Dickibson, Madison's
strong support for the creation of lower federal courts has led to the use of only his
name. See text accompanying notes 29-58 infra. See also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4,
at 11-13; Frank, HistoricalBases of the FederalJudicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROa. 3,
10-13 (1948) (citing as "Great Compromise").
" Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). For a discussion of Sheldon, see text
accompanying notes 53-57 infra.
10See Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
887 (1948); Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 447
F.2d 245 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972); Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688
(D.R.I. 1969); Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1949).
" See 1 J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 243 (1971); B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 13 (1972); 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §§ 1584-90 (1833);
Eisenberg, supra note 3; Goldberg, supra note 4, at 346-48.
12Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
13Over 100 years later, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia adopted
Justice Story's position. See Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1949).
14See Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
887 (1948); Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 447
F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972); West End Neighborhood Corp.
v. Stans, 312 F. Supp. 1060 (D.D.C. 1970); Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.I.
1969).
11 Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr. argued twenty years ago that a congressional limita-

tion on lower federal court jurisdiction could be circumvented by way of a pre-existing
"general grant ofjurisdiction." Hart, The Power of Congressto Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1386-1401 (1953) [hereinafter
referred to in text as the "Dialogue" and cited as Hart]. In an approach similar to Justice
Story's, Professor Julius Goebel maintained that the language of article III mandates the
creation of lower federal courts and prohibits their abolition. 1 J. GOEBEL, supra note 11,
at 246; see text accompanying notes 74-81 infra. And within the last year, Theodore
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limitation on Congress' power over the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts. Many of those commenting on the subject have
argued that the fifth amendment's due process clause must serve
as a check on congressional power under article III to limit the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. The exact nature and
rationale of this due process limit on Congress' power, however,
remain shrouded in uncertainty. Some courts' 6 and commentators' 7 have extended this constitutional limitation without adequately reconciling the requirements of the due process
clause with the compromise reached at the Constitutional Convention which culminated in article III.
More importantly, these theories have neglected in their
constitutional calculus the potentially significant effect of Tarble's
Case.18 There the Supreme Court overturned a habeas corpus
order by a Wisconsin state court to a federal official ordering the
release of an allegedly under-age soldier from the United States
Army. In so doing, the Court reasoned that a state court had no
power to interfere with the operations of federal officials.
Eisenberg asserted that while lower federal courts need not have been originally created,
changing circumstances since 1789 have made their existence a necessity. Eisenberg,
supra note 3; see text accompanying notes 101-41 infra.
16
See, e.g., Manosky v. Bethlehem-Hingham Shipyard, Inc., 177 F.2d 529, 532 (1st
Cir. 1949); Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 887 (1948). The Battaglia court was faced with § 2(d) of the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29
U.S.C. § 252(d) (1970), which purported to withdraw from all federal and state courts
jurisdiction to enforce the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970). This provision was attacked as retroactively destroying
vested rights in violation of the fifth amendment. Judge Chase of the Second Circuit,
despite the command of the provision, upheld the constitutionality of the Act and section
2(d), stating:
A few of the district court decisions sustaining section 2 of the Portal-toPortal Act have done so on the ground that since jurisdiction of federal courts
other than the Supreme Court is conferred by Congress, it may at the will of
Congress be taken away in whole or in part. ... [T]hese district court decisions
would, in effect, sustain subdivision (d) of section 2 of the Act regardless of
whether subdivisions (a) and (b) were valid. We think, however, that the exercise
by Congress of its control over jurisdiction is subject to compliance with at least
the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. That is to say, while Congress has
the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of courts
other than the Supreme Court, it must not so exercise that power as to deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or to take
private property without just compensation. Thus, regardless of whether subdivision (d) of section 2 had an independent end in itself, if one of its effects
would be to deprive the appellants of property without due process or just
compensation, it would be invalid.
169 F.2d
at 257 (citations omitted).
17
See, e.g., Hart, supra note 15, at 1386-1401; text accompanying notes 89-92 infra.
18 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).
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Though Tarble's Case addressed only a state's power to grant
habeas relief, its rationale would seem to preclude any direct
state judicial control of the actions of federal officers. 19 Though
the issue remains in some doubt, substantial precedent has
adopted this interpretation of Tarble's Case. 2 0 If still good law,
this decision would seem to alter much of the basis of the Convention compromise leading up to adoption of article III. For
contrary to the apparent assumption of the framers, Tarble's Case
removes the state courts as a viable forum in certain cases. This
Article will explore the complex tensions that arise among (1) the
dictates of the article III compromise, (2) the implications of
Tarble's Case, and (3) the due process requirements of the fifth
21
amendment.
The first portion of this Article will examine the various
theories previously advanced regarding the extent of congres19 For a thorough discussion of Tarble's Case and its implications, see text accompanying notes 194-202 infra.
20 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Bruce, 298 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1962); Elliot v. Weinberger, 371
F. Supp. 960 (D. Haw. 1974); Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on
other grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972); United States
ex rel. Fort v. Meiszner, 319 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Alabama ex rel. Patterson v.
Jones, 189 F. Supp. 61 (M.D. Ala. 1960); A-ama ex rel. Gallion v. Rogers, 187 F. Supp.
848 (M.D. Ala. 1960), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Dinkens v. Attorney General, 285 F.2d 430
(5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Owlett, 15 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Pa. 1936); Parry v.
Delaney, 310 Mass. 107, 37 N.E.2d 249 (1941); Wasservogel v. Meyerowitz, 300 N.Y. 125,
89 N.E.2d 712 (1949); Armand Schmoll, Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 N.Y. 503, 37
N.E.2d 225 (1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 818 (1942); Hunter v. City of New York, 121
N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Fox v. 34 Hillside Realty Corp., 87 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct.
1949), aff'd, 276 App. Div. 994, 95 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1950); Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of
Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject
Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REV. 387, 439 (1970); Demet, A
Trilogy of Massive Resistance, 46 A.B.A.J. 294 (1960); Note, Jurisdictional Amount in
Injunctive Suits in FederalDistrict Courts, 25 CAL. L. REv. 336 (1937); Note, Limitations on
State Judicial Interference with FederalActivities, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 84, 95-96 (1951); Note,
53 CORNELL L. REV. 916, 926-29 (1968); Note, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 171, 176-78
(1965); Note, Injunctive Suits Against Federal Officers, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 276, 284 n.55
(1972). See also text accompanying notes 166-216 infra.
21 Although many commentators have totally ignored the relation of Tarble's Case to
Congress' power to limit lower federal court jurisdiction, see, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 3;
Hart, supra note 15, recognition of the relevance of Tarble's Case to this issue is by no
means unique to this Article. See, e.g., Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797, 810-11
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965
(1972); Note, The ConstitutionalImplications of the JurisdictionalAmount Provision in Injunction Suits Against Federal Officers, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1474, 1480-82 (1971). Despite this
limited recognition by courts and commentators, however, the full problems and ramifications of Tarble's Case and its effect on Congress' article III power have never been
thoroughly considered. Nor has the current advisability of the rule in Tarble's Case received full examination.
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sional power to control lower federal court jurisdiction. 2 2 Each
will be shown to fail in satisfactorily resolving the dilemma presented when Congress has limited the federal courts and Tarble's
Case has closed the state courts. The second portion will set forth
a new synthesis of congressional power in this area. 23 The synthesis will first present the theoretical basis for a fifth amendment right to an independent judicial determination of constitutional claims. 2 4 The synthesis will then examine the power of
state courts to assume jurisdiction of cases involving federal officers, with particular focus on Tarble's Case.2 5 This examination
will demonstrate that state courts lack the authority to control
the actions of federal officials by writ of mandamus, writ of
habeas corpus, or equitable injunctive powers. From this twopart foundation, the synthesis will conclude by advancing the
proposition that the congressional power over lower federal
court jurisdiction is not absolute but is limited by the due process
clause of the fifth amendment in cases where, because of Tarble's
26
Case, the doors of the state courts are closed.
The apparent incompatibility between the Convention compromise and Tarble's Case will be reconciled to show that a due
process limitation on congressional power is not only constitutionally required but also makes great practical sense in light
of modern notions of federalism. 2 7 The Constitution and the
federal system are best served by recognition of the modern validity of Tarble's Case and the resulting constitutional check on
Congress' power over lower federal court jurisdiction.2 8 On the
other hand, this check is not absolute. Unless we are to allow
the courts to "amend" the Constitution at will, we must accept
the fact that, in cases where an independent judicial forum is
provided, Congress may deny original jurisdiction to the federal
courts and instead vest it in the state courts. However, recognidon of the current validity of Tarble's Case will, by means of the
due process clause, increase the obstacles Congress must overcome to circumvent the federal courts, and quite probably result
22 See text accompanying notes 29-141 infra.

23

See
See
2' See
26See
27See
2
' See
24

text
text
text
text
text
text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

notes 141-257 infra.
notes 141-165 infra.
notes 165-216 infra.
note 217 infra.
notes 245-46 infra.
notes 220-46 infra.
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in an increase in the number of cases constitutionally required
to be heard in federal court.
II.

THE EXISTING THEORIES

Four basic approaches concerning the proper scope of congressional power over lower federal court jurisdiction have been
suggested to date. The first approach emanates from the Constitutional Convention and is here referred to as the Madisonian
Compromise. Justice Story and Professor Goebel advance variations of the second approach based upon the language chosen by
the framers in drafting article III. The final two theories, those
of Professor Henry Hart and Theodore Eisenberg, urge, in varying manners and degrees, external constitutional or political
limitations on Congress' article III power.
A.

The MadisonianCompromise

From the beginning of the debates in the Constitutional
Convention regarding article III, the framers agreed that at least
one national tribunal, a supreme court, would be necessary to
exercise the judicial power of the new nation. 29 However, the
proposal for the creation of national tribunals inferior to the
"one supreme court," met strong opposition among various factions of the Convention.
Several proposals were introduced concerning inferior federal courts. Edmund Randolph of Virginia proposed the mandatory establishment of lower federal courts, 30 as did Charles
Pinckney of South Carolina. 3 1 William Patterson of New Jersey
presented a proposal providing for no inferior courts3 2 and
Alexander Hamilton of New York suggested that Congress be
given the power to create such courts for the determination of
all matters of general concern.3 3 A proposal for the establishment of only lower courts of admiralty was introduced by John
Blair of Virginia.3 4 The Patterson and Randolph plans were referred to the Committee of the Whole. 5
29 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 11.
30 1 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
FARRAND]; Frank, supra note 8, at 10.
31 3 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 600; HART & WECHSLER,
3 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 244; Frank, supra note 8,
33 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 292; HART & WECHSLER,
34 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 11.
35 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 104-05.

104-05 [hereinafter cited as
supra note 4, at 11.

at 10.
supra note 4, at 1I.

JURISDICTION OF LOWER FEDERAL COURTS

1975]

The Randolph plan, providing for "one supreme tribunal,
and . . . one or more inferior tribunals, 36 was adopted by the
Committee of the Whole with little discussion.3 7 Many of the
delegates, however, remained fervently opposed to federal trial
courts, believing that all litigation should be left to the state
courts. The day following its passage, John Rutledge of South
Carolina moved to reconsider the Randolph plan. 38 In support
of his motion he urged that
State Tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases to
decide in the first instance, the right of appeal to the
supreme national tribunal being sufficient to secure the
national rights & uniformity of Judgmts: that it was...
creating unnecessary obstacles to their adoption of the
new system. 39
Sherman of Connecticut agreed, emphasizing the great and un40
necessary expense in setting up a parallel system of courts.
James Madison objected, arguing that appellate review
would inadequately remedy biased trials in state courts. Additionally, he contended that the sheer number of appeals from
the state courts to the "supreme bar" would be totally unmanageable: "[I]nferior [federal] tribunals . . . dispersed throughout
the Republic withfinal jurisdiction in many cases" were needed,
he believed, to insure the future of the nation. 4 1 "An effective
Judiciary establishment commensurate to the legislative authority [is] essential. A Government without a proper Executive &
Judiciary would be the mere trunk of a body without arms or
legs to act or move.

'4 2

The opponents of such courts believed them to be unnecessary, however, because state trial courts would be available as
forums to hear the assertion of federal rights, making the creation of federal trial courts an expensive repetition.4 3 Rutledge
was of the opinion that the right of appeal from state courts to
36 Id. Randolph observed that state courts could "not be trusted with the administration of the national laws." 2 id. 46.
37 1 id. 104-05.
38
Id. 124-25; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 11; Frank, supra note 8, at 10.
39 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 124; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 11.
40 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 125; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 11. See also 1
FARRAND, supra note 30, at 125 (remarks of King).
41 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 124.
42

43

1d .

Id. 125 (remarks of Sherman).
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the Supreme Court was sufficient to protect national interests
and that federal trial courts would constitute an "unnecessary
encroachment" on state court jurisdiction and state sovereignty. 4 4 Rutledge's motion for reconsideration and elimination
of the clause mandating establishment of lower federal courts
carried the Convention, five states to four with two divided.4 5
Madison and James Wilson subsequently offered a compromise solution. 46 While the Randolph plan had mandated
Congress to create lower federal courts, Madison and Wilson
moved to give Congress the option to create or not create such
courts. 47 This distinction caused four states to change their position toward inferior federal courts and the compromise motion
carried, eight states to two with only one divided. 4 8 The Madisonian Compromise had been struck.
The course of events that culminated in this "Great
Compromise" 49 has been interpreted by some to mean that not
only the very existence of lower courts but also the scope of their
jurisdiction was to be in Congress' discretion: 50 "[I]t seems to be
a necessary inference from the express decision that the creation
of inferior federal courts was to rest in the discretion of Congress that the scope of their jurisdiction, once created, was also
to be discretionary.'
Arguing from Congress' discretionary power over the creation of the lower federal courts, some commentators have thus
maintained that Congress has the authority to grant, withhold,
or remove after vestment the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts over particular matters. 52 They argue that if the lower
courts need not have been established in the first instance, they
may be abolished at any time by Congress and that, since they
can be abolished, they can effectively be "abolished" to a lesser
extent by removing or denying jurisdiction over particular cases.
In other words, the greater power of total abolition logically

44Id. 124.
4
SId. 125.
46 Id.
47

Id.

48 Id. 124-25.
49 Frank, supra note 8, at 28.
50 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 12.
51
Id.
5
2 See notes 4 & 50 supra.
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includes the lesser power of removing certain areas from their
jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court further advanced this logic in 1850 in
Sheldon v. Sill,53 where the petitioners challenged the validity of
54
the assignment of claims clause in the Judiciary Act of 1789.
The provision vested diversity jurisdiction in the lower federal
courts but excepted suits based upon assigned promissory notes.
In upholding the provision, the Court concluded that implied in
the congressional power to create inferior federal courts was the
power to limit their jurisdiction to less than the maximum judicial power allowed under article III. Justice Grier, speaking for
the Court, reviewed the two possible interpretations of article III
and chose, in his opinion, the only logical one:
It must be admitted, that if the Constitution had
ordained and established the inferior courts, and distributed to them their respective powers, they could not
be restricted or divested by Congress. But as it made no
such distribution, one of two consequences must result,-either that each inferior courts created by Congress must exercise all the judicial powers not given to
the Supreme Court, or that Congress, having the power
to establish 55the courts, must define their respective
jurisdictions.
The first of these possibilities was untenable, he maintained, because it had never been asserted during the sixty years of the
Republic and could not be reasonably supported even if
asserted. 56 From the second possibility, he believed it logically
followed
that, having a right to prescribe, Congress may withhold
from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the
enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute can

53 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
54 Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 prevented circuit courts from taking
cognizance of any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note or other
chose in action, in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted
in such court to recover the said contents if no assignment had been made,
except in cases of foreign bills of exchange.
The provision has been altered somewhat and now appears as 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1970).
5549 U.S. (8 How.) at 448.
8
Id. at 449.
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have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers. No
one of them can assert a just claim to jurisdiction exclu57
sively conferred on another, or withheld from all.
Thus, the compromise reached as to the creation of the inferior
courts was interpreted to extend also to the conferral of jurisdiction upon them.
The possibility that Congress would decide not to create
lower federal courts was naturally inherent in the Madisonian
Compromise. Thus it presumably was Madison's view-as it
clearly was Rutledge's-that in such an event state courts would
be able to provide adequate remedies to litigants with federal
claims. The Madisonian Compromise was based, therefore, on
the assumption that lower federal courts need not exist because
state courts could always stand in their stead to provide adequate
58
remedies and dispense justice as needed.
B.

Theories Based on the Language of Article III
1. Justice Story and "Shall Be Vested"

Disregarding any possible light shed by the debates in the
Constitutional Convention, Justice Story early advocated that the
phrase "shall be vested" in section 1 of article III lent itself to
only one reasonable interpretation. He maintained that these
words clearly meant that the entire federal jurisdictional power
had to be vested in some federal court. In Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee5 9 he pointed out that since article III vested national judicial power wherever the Supreme Court lacked original jurisdiction, it logically followed that "Congress are bound to create
some inferior courts, in which to vest all that jurisdiction which,
under the constitution, is exclusively vested in the United States,
57

Id.

58 As will be seen below, see text accompanying notes 219-40 infra, the fundamental
underpinning of the Madisonian Compromise may today very well be flawed. State
courts may be powerless to dispense justice in suits seeking injunctive relief against
federal officers. While not apparent at the time of the Compromise, the manifestation of
that doctrine changes the impact of the Compromise on the extent of congressional
power over lower federal court jurisdiction. if, as contended here, state courts are not a
viable alternative to lower federal courts for the adjudication of constitutional claims
against federal officers, the Madisonian Compromise is inadequate in assuring a litigant's
right to a forum for his constitutional claim. Thus the Compromise may well fall to the
extent its conclusions are inconsistent with the requirements of due process.
59 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).

JURISDICTION OF LOWER FEDERAL COURTS

1975]

and of which the supreme court cannot take original cognizance." 60 He asserted that the strong words chosen by the framers in drafting article III mandated the first Congress to vest the
entire national judicial power in federal courts:
The language of the article throughout is manifestly
designed to be mandatory upon the legislature. Its obligatory force is so imperative, that congress could not,
without a violation of its duty, have refused to carry it
into operation. The judicial power of the United States
shall be vested (not may be vested) in one supreme court,
and in such inferior courts as congress may, from time
to time, ordain and establish....
If, then, it is the duty of congress to vest the judicial
power of the United States, it is a duty to vest the whole
judicial power. The language, if imperative to one part,
61
is imperative as to all.

Although the establishment of the Supreme Court was required by article III, Justice Story admitted that "whether it is
equally obligatory to establish inferior courts, is a question of
some difficuy.. 62 But, if such courts were not established, he
reasoned, the dictates of article III that the national judicial
power shall vest might be frustrated:
If congress may lawfully omit to establish inferior
courts, it might follow, that in some of the enumerated
cases, the judicial power could nowhere exist. .

.

. It

would seem, therefore, to follow, that congress are
bound to create some inferior courts, in which to vest all
that jurisdiction which, under the constitution, is exclusively vested in the United States, and of which
the
63
supreme court cannot take original cognizance.
Justice Story assumed that state courts had no power to hear
initially federal causes of action.6 4 Rather, state courts could only
hear federal matters that arose in state causes of action. Thus
since the Supreme Court in most cases possessed only appellate
jurisdiction, Justice Story asserted that if lower federal courts did
not exist a federal cause of action would never be heard. There6 Id. at 331 (emphasis supplied).
61Id. at 328-30.
Id.at 330.
63Id. at 330-31 (emphasis supplied).
64
Id. at 338-40.
62
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fore, the required creation of lower federal courts logically followed from the Constitution's mandate that the national judicial
power be vested somewhere in the federal judiciary.
Justice Story found further support in the strong language
chosen by the framers for section 2 of article III:
This construction will be fortified by an attentive examination of the second section of the third article. The
words are "the judicial power shall extend," &c. Much
minute and elaborate criticism has been employed upon
these words. It has been argued that they are equivalent
to the words "may extend," and that "extend" means to
widen to new cases not before within the scope of the
power. For the reasons which have already been stated,
we are of the opinion that the words are used in an
imperative 65
sense; they import an absolute grant of judicial power.
Justice Story later restated his position in his Commentaries on
the Constitution.6 6 Addressing himself to arguments that Congress
had been given discretion by the framers to create inferior federal courts, he stated:
If congress possess any discretion on this subject, it is
obvious, that the judiciary, as a co-ordinate department
of the government, may, at the will of congress, be annihilated, or stripped of all its important jurisdiction;
for, if the discretion exists, no one can say in what manner, or at what time, or under what circumstances it
67
may, or ought to be exercised.
As has been noted by various commentators, Story's position
ignores the history of article III during the Constitutional
Convention.6 8 Some criticize Justice Story's interpretation of the
words "shall be vested" as imperative in nature. 69 As has been
pointed out, the framers clearly intended to grant Congress the
65

Id. at 331.

66 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON-THE CONSTITUTION §§ 1584-90 (1833).
67
1d.
68

§ 1584.

See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 313; C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE

CONSTITUTION 325 (1937). One commentator suggests that Justice Story desired federal
question jurisdiction for the lower federal courts and that his dicta in Martin were,
apparently, an appeal to Congress--an appeal that failed. G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING,
CASES & MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 58 (8th ed. 1970).
69 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 13 n.46.
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discretionary power to create lower federal courts.70 Hence it is
virtually inconceivable that the phrase "shall be vested" was intended to require the creation of lower federal courts. Perhaps
the greatest flaw in Justice Story's theory, however, is his assertion that the command that the judicial power "shall be vested"
in some federal court is met only when lower federal courts exist.
Story rests his theory on the assertion that lower federal courts
must exist to hear federal claims because state courts lack the
authority to do so. But that assertion is clearly erroneous; state
courts generally do have jurisdiction to hear federal claims, or
at least are capable of receiving such jurisdiction. 7 1 Therefore,
as long as the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over
state courts, the command "shall be vested" is met by the existence of the Supreme Court and lower federal courts are not
72
needed.
The lack of general support for Justice Story's position in
the 160 years since its first exposition is thus understandable.7

3

It

is premised on apparently incorrect assumptions about the nature of federal supremacy and seems to be in direct conflict with
the language and intent of article III.
2. Professor Goebel and "Ordain and Establish"
Unlike Justice Story, Professor Julius Goebel bases his theory of article III on events of the Constitutional Convention.74 Focusing on words not emphasized by Justice Story,
Goebel examines the revisions made by the Committee of Style
to the first section of article III. When the Convention first
submitted the section to the Committee of Styie it read: "The
Judicial Power of the United States both in law and equity shall
be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such Inferior Courts as
shall, when necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the
See text accompanying notes 41-52 supra.
See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
72 It should be noted that if one accepts Story's theory that article III requires that
some federal court have jurisdiction in all the areas enumerated therein (a dubious
assumption), Congress could refuse to create lower federal courts only if it invested full
appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, and did not limit state court power to hear
causes of action involving federal judicial power.
73But see Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1949); 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLITXCS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 613-16 (1953).
74 1 J. GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 240.
70
71
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Legislature of the United States. '7 5 The Committee on Style,
however, redrafted the provision to read: "The judicial power of
the United States, both in law and equity, shall be vested in one
supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish. ' 76 This slight revision
made by the Committee had a great impact, according to Professor Goebel. 7 7 He maintains that the words "ordain and establish," when viewed in light of their meaning at the time of the
drafting of article III, demonstrate that the Convention intended that lower courts be created:
The effect of eliminating the words "as shall, when
necessary" was to deprive Congress of power to decide
upon the need for inferior courts and so to give full
imperative effect to the declaration that "The judicial
power... shall be vested in one supreme court, and in
such inferior courts. . . ." That the Committee intended
to convey the sense of an imperative is apparent from
the choice of the most forceful words in the contemporary
constitutional
vocabulary-"ordain
and
establish"-to direct what Congress was to do.... These
were the words of fiat used by the people of the United
States in the preamble of the new Constitution. The
selection of these words to replace the less affirmative
"constitute" could only have been deliberate. We believe
that their function was to assure that federal inferior
courts must be created, and further
that designation of
78
state tribunals would not do.
Therefore, according to Professor Goebel, no discretion was
given to Congress in creating lower federal courts, but rather
"The discretion left to Congress was the authority to settle the
institutional pattern at the lower level of judicial administration
and to arrange how the jurisdiction conferred by section 2 of
Article III was there to be disposed. ' 79 And, furthermore, the
words "may from time to time" had their own special meaning.
That phrase was intended to "secure the right of Congress to
make such occasional rearrangements in the structure once set
75

Id. 246; 2 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 603.
I J. GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 246; 2 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 600.
77 1 J. GOEBEL,supra note 11, at 246.
78
Id.
79
Id.
76
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up as it might wish. In other words, the intendment of the new
language was that considerations of public convenience, and not
of necessity, were to govern Congress.

' 80

Professor Goebel's position is susceptible to much the same
criticism as that levied on Justice Story's theory. 81 Although he
does refer to the history of the drafting of the article, Professor
Goebel, like Justice Story, maintains that Congress had no choice
but to create lower federal courts. But also like Justice Story, he
asserts this despite the fact that the Convention debates clearly
indicate the framers compromised by awarding Congress discretionary power as to their creation. Nor are his arguments
concerning the wording of article III especially convincing.
Though etymologists might argue the point, it remains to be
seen that the words "ordain and establish" are significantly more
imperative than the phrasing of the original draft.
C. ProfessorHart's "Dialogue"
The modern touchstone of any serious thinking in the area
of congressional control of federal jurisdiction is Professor
Henry M. Hart's famous "Dialogue" published in 1953.82 Despite
or perhaps because of this fact, the "Dialogue" has not been
subjected to extensive critical review. This is true even though
80

Id.

8' See text accompanying notes 68-73 supra. Professor Bator criticizes Goebel's argu-

ments, dismissing them as "uncharacteristically thinly supported and unpersuasive."
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 13 n.46. Professor Bator asserts that Goebel's argument based on the framer's editing of the drafts of article III deserves little attention.
Goebel bases his position, Bator states, "simply" on the proposition that" 'ordain' is more
imperative than 'constitute'; and that the words 'may from time to time' were intended
merely to authorize Congress to make minor adjustments in court structure." Id. Bator
suggests that Goebel may have been "partly misled" by "his apparent assumption that the
Circuit Courts created by the FirstJudiciary Act received the whole of the federal judicial
power...; in fact these courts were granted only a small proportion of the judicial power
defined by Article III." Id.
82 Hart, supra note 15. Professor Hart's article has come to be known as the
"Dialogue", see, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 330, and will be so referred to
here. Professor Paul Bator of Harvard revised the chapter of Hart & Wechsler containing
the reproduction of the "Dialogue" and updated and added extensively to the
"Dialogue's" footnotes. See id.
The "Dialogue" is organized into eight major sections. For the most part, each
section relates to a category of congressional limitation that may be imposed on federal
courts. The sections under examination here are "I. Limitations as to Which Court Has
Jurisdiction," and "VII. Denial of Jurisdiction: Plaintiffs Complaining of Extra-Judicial
Governmental Coercion." It is in the latter section that Professor Hart introduces his
theory of "the general grant of jurisdiction" as an escape device from a congressional
limitation on federal court jurisdiction. See text accompanying notes 89-92 infra.
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the "Dialogue" may suffer from substantial analytical flaws that
seriously detract from its effectiveness.
While the theory advanced by Professor Hart is generally
regarded as preeminent on the subject, it is surprisingly difficult
to restate. This difficulty stems from what seem to be internal
inconsistencies in analysis.
The "Dialogue" takes the form of an enthusiastic exchange
between two imaginary scholars, Q and A. Questions by the inquisitive but somewhat naive Q are answered in varying degrees
of detail and clarity by A. The "Dialogue" begins with an exchange concerning congressional power over inferior federal
court jurisdiction. In a nutshell, it describes one of Hart's two
lines of argument:
Q.
A.

Does the Constitution give people any right to proceed or be proceeded against, in the first instance,
in a federal rather than a state court?
It's hard to see how the answer can be anything but
no, in view of cases like Sheldon v. Sill and Lauf v. E.
G. Shinner & Co., and in view of the language and
history of the Constitution itself. Congress seems to
have plenary power to limit federal jurisdiction
when the consequence is merely to force proceed83
ings to be brought, if at all, in a state court.

Professor Hart argues, in this opening exchange, that Congress
can prevent litigants from bringing their claims in a federal
court because another forum, the state courts, is available. Hart
seems to be implying (as he later makes clear)84 that the fifth
amendment's due process clause may require an independent
judicial forum for the adjudication of constitutional claims. He
recognizes at this point in his analysis, however, that that requirement may just as easily be filled by a state court as by a
federal court. Perhaps anticipating a basic problem with such a
simple hypothesis, the "Dialogue" continues:
Q.
A.

83

But suppose the state court disclaims any jurisdiction?
If federal rights are involved, perhaps the state
courts are under a constitutional obligation to vin85
dicate them.

Hart, supra note 15, at 1363-64 (footnote omitted).

84 Id. 1372-73.
85 Id. 1364 (footnote omitted).
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In other words, Professor Hart believes that state courts are
constitutionally compelled to recognize jurisdiction when a claim
before them is federal in nature.8 6
The inherent flaw in this opening exchange is Professor
Hart's failure to consider the possible ramifications of Tarble's
Case and the line of cases following it, which hold that state
courts lack jurisdiction to entertain cases seeking to enjoin federal officials. Hence, regardless of whether a state court could
refuse of its own volition to hear such a case (a possibility which
A apparently denies in his response above), 7 under Tarble's Case
it may be constitutionally powerless to assume jurisdiction.88

Later in the "Dialogue" Harts second line of argument appears. In the central thrust of his theory, he focuses Q and A on
the situation in which Congress has withdrawn the jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts to review an extrajudicial coercion of
private individuals. He states the hypothetical in the following
terms:
Q.

8'

All right, then, now comes the sixty-four dollar
question we've been avoiding. What happens if the
Government is hurting people and not simply refusing to help them? Suppose Congress authorizes
a program of direct action by Government officials
against private persons or private property. Suppose, further, that it not only dispenses with judicial enforcement but either limits the jurisdiction of
the federal courts to inquire into what the officials
do or denies it altogether.8 9

Note that Professor Hart says that perhaps state courts have such a duty. His
equivocation is left unexplained. Note also that he does not discuss what would result if
state courts did not have such a duty.
87 Text accompanying note 85 supra.
11Professor Bator, in revising the "Dialogue's" footnotes, asks:
[W]hat if Congress withdraws jurisdiction only from the lower federal courts: is
this an unconstitutional suspension if the state courts are left free to issue the
writ? (Of course the state courts would be free to do so only on the
assumption-surely warranted-that in such an event the dubious rule of
Tarble's Case,... that the state courts may not issue the writ to federal prisoners, would not survive.).
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 357 n.48. Thus, unlike Professor Hart, Professor
Bator seems to recognize the need in the "Dialogue" to consider the possible implications
of Tarble's Case. Professor Bator may dismiss Tarble's Case too hastily, however. In any
event, he acknowledges a possible problem only in relation to the habeas situation. As will
be seen below, it is by no means clear that Tarble's Case is logically limited to matters of
habeas corpus. See text accompanying notes 214, & 219-27 infra.
89 Hart, supra note 15, at 1386-87.
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Despite the position A advanced in the opening exchange that
Congress had plenary power because state courts are available, 90
A now answers differently. Although A's original position apparently would apply to this hypothetical, A announces that the
answer to this question is "easy... so long as there is any applicable grant of general jurisdiction." 9 1 He elaborates:
Obviously, the answer is that the validity of the
jurisdictional limitation depends on the validity of the
program itself, or the particular part of it in question. If
the court finds that what is being done is invalid, its
duty is simply to declare the jurisdictional limitation invalid also, and
then proceed under the general grant of
92
jurisdiction.
This answer necessarily presupposes two things. First, A
presumes that despite the fact that jurisdiction over the particular subject matter has been explicitly removed, the court will
ignore it long enough to decide the merits of the case. If the
program itself is found constitutional, the limitation on the
court's power to review the program will be valid. In effect, this
means that the limitation is always invalid, since the sole purpose
of the limitation is presumably to prevent the very inquiry into
the validity of the program's merits which Hart suggests is permitted. A limitation that is valid only when it is not necessary is
not really a limitation at all. This conclusion that the federal
court may disregard a congressional limitation on its jurisdiction
is difficult to understand in light of A's opening remark that a
litigant has no constitutional right to a federal forum as long as a
state court is available. 9 3 If Congress has no obligation to provide
a federal forum as long as state courts are available under A's
earlier position, why should a federal court use a general grant
of jurisdiction to decide the merits of a case where Congress has
withdrawn its power to do so? If, as Hart suggested earlier, 9 4 a
state court has full power-indeed, a duty-to review the constitutionality of federal legislation and to invalidate it if neces90 Text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.

9'Hart, supra note 15, at 1387.
92Id.

Text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
'4 Text accompanying note 85 supra.
'3
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sary, how can there exist a constitutional power in the federal
court to disregard the congressional limitation on its jurisdiction?
After all, so long as they do no violence to the requirements of
due process or some other constitutional provision, it would
seem that the dictates of article III must be obeyed.
Second, A's "answer" to Q's "sixty-four dollar question" presumes that when limiting lower federal court jurisdiction Congress is nevertheless leaving all general grants of jurisdiction
intact. This is conceptually difficult to accept. When Congress
limits lower federal court jurisdiction over a particular matter, it
necessarily is suspending all available general grants of jurisdiction with respect to that particular matter. In other words, the
so-called "general" grant of jurisdiction is no longer "general." It
has, in effect, been amended by subsequent legislation (that is, by
the limitation in question) so as to be "general" for all cases except
the type described in the limitation itself. This must be true, or
the limitation Congress has imposed is no limitation at all. It
must be assumed that when Congress acts it intends to accomplish an end-that it would not enact a jurisdictional limitation
that does not limit. Any limitation on jurisdiction must necessarily amend all applicable grants of jurisdiction or Congress has
performed a nullity.
Furthermore, were we to accept Hart's reasoning, his emphasis on the need for an initial general grant of jurisdiction is
puzzling. If Hart is correct that the Constitution itself compels
the federal courts to disregard the limitation, then what possible
difference does it make whether Congress has provided a general grant of jurisdiction? If it is the Constitution that compels
federal courts to ignore the limitation, it is of no consequence
whether Congress has provided a general grant of jurisdiction;
once the command to a federal court to hear a case assumes a
constitutional dimension, Congress' desire to have the court hear
that case would seem wholly irrelevant, for obviously the Constitution supersedes congressional desires.
Feeling that he has satisfactorily resolved all doubt as to
Congress' authority to limit jurisdiction when a general grant of
jurisdiction is available, Hart attempts to tie together the loose
ends of his analysis. What happens, Q asks, when Congress withdraws jurisdiction from the federal courts and no general grant
of jurisdiction is available for the court to employ as a
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springboard? 9 5 As though the answer were evident from the
course of the "Dialogue," A answers:
A.

I've given all the important answers to that question, haven't I? I would have thought the rest was
clear. Why, it's been clear ever since September 17,
1787.
... The state courts. In the scheme of the Constitution, they are the primary guarantors of constitutional rights, 9and
in many cases they may be
6
the ultimate ones.

This closing exchange is consistent with the opening round between Q and A. 97 However, both exchanges seem puzzlingly inconsistent with the argument Hart advances midway through the
"Dialogue" regarding general grants of jurisdiction as an escape
device for the federal courts. 98 For if, as Hart recognizes at both
the beginning and end of the "Dialogue," state courts are always available to hear federal claims, why do federal courts ever
have authority to resist a congressional limitation on their
jurisdiction?9 9
The most significant problem with Professor Hart's theory,
however, is his total neglect of the potential impact of Tarble's
Case. Once this case is plugged into his equation, the theory
becomes subject to serious question. Tarble's Case may well prevent state courts from hearing a case seeking to enjoin or otherwise directly control the actions of a federal officer. In such a
case, Hart's theory is of no use. Because it fails to deal with the
problem of Tarble's Case, Hart's theory is not especially helpful in
providing an answer to the dilemma under examination here.' 0 0
956 Hart, supra note 15, at 1401.
9 1d

.

97 Text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
98

Text accompanying notes 89-92 supra.

99 There are situations in which Congress has attempted to limit state, as well as

federal court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-62
(1970). As the Second Circuit in Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948), correctly recognized, such a total limitation on
judicial review of the assertion of constitutional rights may well violate due process. See
text accompanying note 217 infra. However, in light of the clear dictates of the Madisonian Compromise-i.e., that federal court jurisdiction could always be limited because
state courts would always be available to hear federal claims-it would seem logical (at
least in disregard of the full implications of Tarble's Case) for only the limitation on state
court jurisdiction to fall in such a case.
100It should be emphasized that several potentially significant arguments exist which
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D. The "ChangingCircumstances" Theory
The most recent theory advanced on the subject of congressional power over lower federal court jurisdiction is Theodore
Eisenberg's. 1° 1 Unlike Professor Hart and proponents of the
Madisonian Compromise, Eisenberg refutes the basic proposition that Congress may abolish lower federal courts.' 0 2 Because
they may not be abolished, he maintains, it logically follows that
Congress cannot "selectively curtail jurisdiction or resort to cer10 3
tain remedies."'
Eisenberg admits that based solely on the debates in the
Constitutional Convention, Professor Hart's theory is more convincing than either Justice Story's or Professor Goebel's. 0 4 In
other words, at the time of the drafting of article III the words
chosen by the framers meant exactly what they said: Congress
was vested with discretion to establish and abolish lower federal
courts. Eisenberg argues, however, that times and circumstances
have changed. To lend "contemporary validity" to the theory
based on the Compromise, the theory, he says, "must come to
terms with circumstances affecting the framers' decision and
their view of the national judiciary's functions.' 0 5 Therefore, he
maintains that
[i]f, because of changing circumstances, the framers' aspirations for the national judiciary cannot be fulfilled
today without lower federal courts, then there is a conflict between the Hart and Wechsler view of the decision to leave creation of lower courts to Congress' whim
and the
constitutional definition of the judiciary's
06

role.

Eisenberg concludes that lower federal courts must exist and
cannot be abolished, arguing that the framers envisioned the
national judiciary's role in a certain way.10 7 This role might well
have been fulfilled early in the nation's history without the need
would limit or exclude the effect of Tarble's Case in such situations. See text accompanying
notes 219-46 infra. Professor Hart's analysis, however, excludes any reference to Tarble's
Case whatsoever, and hence does not raise these arguments.
101Eisenberg, supra note 3.
102 Id. 501-13.
103 Id. 501. But see notes 129-34 infra & accompanying text.
104 Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 504.
105 Id.
106 Id.
7
10 Id. 505.
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for lower federal courts. However, he insists, present circumstances are such that the role envisioned by the framers can only
be achieved with the existence of lower federal courts. Basically,
history has amended the language and intent of article III.
The national judiciary, Eisenberg believes, was intended to
perform various roles. It was to provide a check on the other two
branches of government.10 8 It was to achieve uniformity of decisions in questions of national concern.' 0 9 It was to counteract
local biases and prejudices of state courts by providing a forum
to foreign citizens, out-of-state litigants, and the federal government itself. 110 Its ultimate role, however, was "to be able to hear
and do justice in all cases within its jurisdiction."''
In a style reminiscent of Professor Hart's "Dialogue," Eisenberg asks the obvious question and answers it to his satisfaction:
One is tempted to ask how the framers could both
intend the federal judiciary to be capable of hearing all
cases within its jurisdiction and at the same time not
explicitly incorporate inferior federal courts into the
constitutional scheme. The answer is that the founding
fathers felt that the right to appellate review by the
Supreme Court would be sufficient to ensure that all
litigants with cases within the federal constitutional
jurisdiction2 would have their cases heard by a national
tribunal. 11
He finds no problem in such an intent on the part of the framers:
The framers' apparent willingness to limit the federal role to an appellate role in the form of Supreme
Court review was perfectly understandable at the time.
Without question, the Supreme Court was then capable
of providing a forum for all federal cases .... Since the
Court's jurisdiction was not discretionary, any litigant
whose case fell within the federal judicial power and
108 Id.

Id.
110Id.506.
109

"'I

d.

Id. 508 (footnote omitted). As further support for this contention, he points out
that the Constitution did not provide for discretionary jurisdiction in the federal courts.
Therefore, he maintains, while "[t]he federal forum may have been limited to appellate
review. ... it was to be available in all cases." Id. 509.
112
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who was determined to have a federal forum hear his
case could have had such
a forum even in the absence
113
of lower federal courts.
But today, he asserts, circumstances are different and, practically
speaking, the Supreme Court is unable alone to hear all cases
within the jurisdiction of the national judiciary: "Since the early
days of the republic, however, the number of federal cases has
increased dramatically. . . . The Supreme Court is clearly no
longer capable of providing a federal forum to hear the merits
of every case involving a federal question."' 1 4 In light of current
practicalities, he asserts, "If Congress were to abolish the lower
federal courts, this aspect of the national judiciary's role would
fall upon the Supreme Court in the form of review of state court
decisions."' " 5 And if Congress were allowed to abolish the lower
federal courts, "[t]he inevitable result would be that few litigants
with federal claims could be heard in a federal court even on
appeal."" 6 The role envisioned by the framers would therefore
7
be frustrated."
Eisenberg's primary goal is laudable. The existence of lower
federal courts insures that constitutional rights will be protected.
Lower federal courts represent "more than mere federal trial
forums for cases falling within the article III jurisdictional
113

Id. 509-10 (footnote omitted). Eisenberg points out that in the first four years of
the Court no cases were argued before it and that between 1789 and 1801, the Court
disposed of fewer than ninety cases.
114Id. 510 (footnotes omitted). Eisenberg points out that in the 1972 term the Court
disposed of 3,748 cases.
"Id. 510.
116 Id. (footnote omitted).
117 In this way, Eisenberg insists that the lower federal courts are indispensable to the
scheme contemplated by the framers in article III. The practicalities of the day make the
lower federal courts more than mere trial forums. Because it is impossible for the Supreme Court to decide every federal case, he argues, it is the responsibility of the lower
federal courts to enforce the law made by the Supreme Court. And also, because Supreme Court review is more and more selective, the lower courts necessarily have become, he states, "the primary vindicators of federal rights." Id. 511 (footnote omitted).
Changed circumstances require their creation and forbid their abolition:
It is thus no longer reasonable to assert that Congress may simply abolish
the lower federal courts. When Supreme Court review of all cases within Article
III jurisdiction was possible, lower federal courts were perhaps unnecessary. As
federal caseloads grew, however, lower federal courts became necessary components of the national judiciary if the constitutional duty of case by case consideration of all federal cases was to be fulfilled. It can now be asserted that their
existence in some form is constitutionally required.
Id. 513 (footnote omitted).
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grant." 1 8 Rather, they are the enforcers of Supreme Court decisions and the "primary vindicators of federal rights" where that
Court has remained silent. 119 Federal courts do offer greater
experience, familiarity, and sensitivity toward federal interests
and constitutional issues.' 20 Insuring that federal courts adjudicate federal constitutional claims makes profound practical serrse
when the only other alternatives are to have such claims and
interests decided by state courts, less familiar with federal law
and more localized in experience and perception, or have them
heard by no court at all.
But however laudable Eisenberg's primary goal may be, his
theory is sorely inadequate in various respects and cannot be
relied upon to solve the dilemma confronting us here. First, his
theory is historically inaccurate in light of the clear language and
intent of article III as illuminated by the course of events during
the Constitutional Convention. 12 1 Eisenberg maintains that the
Madisonian Compromise was "not central to the constitutional
scheme."' 22 In support of this remark, he points to the "existence of lower federal courts since the first Congress.' 1 23 The
force of this point is considerably weakened when it is recalled
that, although lower courts have existed since 1789, they did not
1181d. 511.

119Id. (footnote omitted).
120See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 513-14 (1973):

[B]y enactment of [42 U.S.C. § 1983] . . . Congress recognized important
interests in permitting a plaintiff to choose a federal forum in cases arising
under federal law ....
This grant of jurisdiction was designed to preserve and
enhance the expertise of federal courts in applying federal law; to achieve greater uniformity of results; and, since federal courts are "more likely to apply
federal law sympathetically and understandingly than are state courts" . . . to
minimize misapplications of federal law. (footnotes omitted).
The Court earlier, in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972), stated:
[T]he very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the
States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the
people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, "whether that
action be executive, legislative, or judicial." (footnotes omitted).
See generally Note, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1180, 1182-84.
121See text accompanying notes 29-48 supra.
122Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 504; see note 106 supra.
123 Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 504. In further support of his point that the Madisonian Compromise was not essential, Eisenberg argues that "[n]either the final arrangement nor any of the five judiciary plans submitted to the [Constitutional] Convention gave federal courts authority to decline to hear a case." Id. 508 (footnote omitted).
That the federal courts themselves were not given authority to decline to hear a case,
however, seems wholly irrelevant to the framers' desire to provide Congress the discretion
to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
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receive general federal question jurisdiction until 1875.124 Hence
such courts were virtually worthless to litigants of federal claims
until 1875. Litigants of federal claims were left to proceed in
state courts, as the framers had intended under the compromise
drafting of article III.
Second, his assertion that new conditions can amend the
clear language and intent of the Constitution is subject to doubt.
"Changing circumstances" might be considered in the interpretation of such broadly phrased constitutional provisions as the due
process and commerce clauses. 125 These clauses were expansively drafted in order to be susceptible to evolving interpretations as time would require. The debates clearly disclose, however, that the framers did not intend, nor does the language
permit, such broad interpretations of article III. "Changing circumstances" cannot amend and alter the meaning of clear and
rigidly drafted language in the Constitution. Of course, most of
the provisions of the Constitution are broadly phrased, with at
best a hazy understanding of the framers' intent, thus permitting
flexible interpretations to take account of changing social
conditions. 126 But the terms of article III are not so broadly
phrased, 127 nor is there any substantial doubt as to the framers'
intent. Unless the judiciary is to be permitted virtually absolute
power to disregard the outer rational limits of constitutional
language in altering the law to meet new conditions-an un124 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
Technically, general federal question jurisdiction was first granted by the Judiciary Act of
1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89; but it was quickly repealed, Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat.
132. See C. WRIGrr, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 5 (1970); Eisenberg,
supra note 3, at 528 n.168.
125 Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 504. As support for his argument, Eisenberg cites
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941); and Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 443 (1934). He asserts that "[t]hese cases support the propriety,
perhaps even the necessity of reinterpreting early constitutional formulations in light of
changed circumstances." Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 504, n.35. But see note 127 infra.
126 The interpretation of the sixth amendment's right to counsel provision, for example, experienced an evolution affected by changing conditions. Compare Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
127 Eisenberg does argue that "[a]n equally rational reading of Article III" is Justice
Story's view, requiring the creation of lower federal courts. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at
502. It does not appear, however, that Eisenberg actually adopts this historical view, since
if he did there would have been no need to devise his intricate theory of changing
circumstances. In any event, as noted above, text accompanying notes 70-73 supra, Story's
theory is defective in its inaccurate assumption that state courts possess no original
jurisdiction to hear federal ciuses of action.
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wise result, we would submit-the "changing circumstances"
theory cannot be employed to alter the existing understanding
of article III.
The seventh amendment, for example, provides that in
all cases where the "value in controversy" exceeds twenty dollars,
the right to a jury trial at common law must be preserved. It
might be argued that use of a twenty dollar floor does not today
accomplish the framers' goal of precluding a jury trial in minor
civil cases, for twenty dollars at the time of the drafting of the
seventh amendment meant something quite different from
twenty dollars today. But despite such an argument, we could
not read an inflationary spiral into the terms of the seventh
amendment. The seventh amendment is strict and unbending
in its dictates on this matter. If we are to alter it, even in order to
accomplish the framers' goal, we must do so through the amendment process. Similarly, the language and history of article III
are so clear that any alteration, even to accomplish the framers'
purposes, must come by amendment and not by interpretation
in light of "changing circumstances." Hence, even if we were
to accept Eisenberg's questionable argument that the original purposes of the framers cannot be achieved by a literal application
of article 111,128 this would provide no basis for disregarding
the explicit language and intent of a constitutional provision.
Though Eisenberg's arguments, if accepted, would seem
logically to lead to an absence of any power on Congress' part to
limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts; he does not
reach this conclusion. On the contrary, he asserts, "While Congress does not have unfettered control over lower court jurisdiction such that it could in effect abolish the courts by obliterating
their jurisdiction, it is also clear that some degree of congres128 Eisenberg asserts that the framers intended the national judiciary to fulfill the
goals of checking the other branches and attaining uniformity of decision. See Eisenberg,
supra note 3, at 505. Absent the limitations of Tarble's Case, however, there would seem to
be no reason why state courts could not theoretically perform the function of checking
the majoritarian branches. It is true that there is less likelihood of uniformity in state
courts than in federal courts, but it is questionable whether the lower federal courts are
really able to achieve anything approaching the uniformity envisioned by the framers.
After all, they were contemplating true uniformity, derived by lodging final decisional
power in one judicial body. This is a far cry from the plethora of conflicting decisions
today coming out of the district and circuit courts. Thus the state courts today can
theoretically perform one of the framers' goals as well as the federal courts, and not even
the federal courts themselves can adequately perform the other.
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sional control, consistent with the Constitution, is valid."' 2 9 Congress has "some Article III authority" to limit lower federal court
jurisdiction; but such power is limited, he maintains, to "prudent
steps which help avoid case overloads."' 130 He terms this the
power to enact "neutral" statutes limiting jurisdiction to promote
efficiency and avoid case overloads. The obvious example of the
exercise of this power by Congress is the $10,000 jurisdictional
amount requirement. 13' Neutral statutes promoting efficiency
are necessary and permissible, he believes, because "The availability of a federal lower court forum for each case should be
sacrificed only when providing such a forum would seriously
undermine the judicial system. An overabundance of federal
forums with unrestricted jurisdiction to hear all federal cases
could in fact undermine the judiciary."'132 This is true, he feels,
because the expense of such an expanded system makes it impractical and would result in a larger caseload which in turn
would necessitate the appointment of more judges. 133 The appointing of more judges, he maintains, would decrease the prestige attached to a federal judgeship, thereby decreasing the quality of federal courts.' 3 4 For these reasons, jurisdictional limitations designed to make the judicial machinery operate better are
permissible.
129Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 514.
3
1 0 Id. 516.
131
In practice, the current jurisdictional scheme satisfies the above princi-

ples remarkably well. . . . The cases which fall under the Article III jurisdictional grant but which today receive federal court consideration only on review
by the Supreme Court are consistent with the suggested principle. They fall into
three main classes: (1) state criminal prosecutions; (2) federal question and diversity cases with less than $10,000 in controversy; and (3) those cases in which a
federal question may be lurking in the background but which do not arise under
the Constitution or laws of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.
Id. (footnote omitted). If these cases could be brought in federal court, he asserts, "the
courts would be swamped or the judiciary would have to be expanded to a dangerous
extent."
Id. 517 (footnote omitted).
132
Id. 515.
133 Id.
134 Eisenberg believes that an increase in the number of judges would mean a decrease in the prestige attached to being a judge. He cites Judge Friendly as stating that
prestige is needed if the federal bench is to continue to attract qualified lawyers as
federal judges. Id. Judge Friendly stated: "Any deterioration in the quality of the district
judges individually or of their performance collectively would destroy the very values the
federal court system is meant to attain." H. FRIENDLY, FEDERALJURISDICTION: A GENERAL
VIEw 30 (1973).
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The exception Eisenberg carves out of his theory for
"neutral statutes" that promote efficiency is of questionable logical force. This is especially true in light of his primary position
that lower federal courts cannot be abolished. He insists that the
primary role intended for the national judiciary by the framers
was "to hear and do justice in all cases within its [article III]
jurisdiction." 135 He rejects the alternative of appellate review by
the Supreme Court of state court decisions involving federal
questions. However, his "neutral scheme" exception necessitates
that federal questions be determined by state courts with the
extreme unlikelihood of review by the Supreme Court. Once
having argued the constitutional necessity for a federal forum
for such cases, he retreats from that position and permits a nonconstitutionally required exception.
Eisenberg fails to recognize that violence to constitutional
rights may be achieved just as much by a neutral scheme promoting efficiency as by legislation spurred by "substantive disagreement" with judicial decisions. Neutral schemes promoting efficiency are permissible, he maintains, because they are not the
product of a congressional motive to hinder the performance of
the judicial function. He believes that "in practice it has not been
difficult to distinguish legislation motivated by efficiency considerations from political reaction."'136 Motive, however, is generally
unimportant when the protection of constitutional rights is at
issue.' 37 A good faith intent on the part of Congress can be as
injurious to constitutional rights as a bad faith political intent. A
$10,000 jurisdictional amount limitation on claims, for example,
while prima facie free of political overtones or bad faith, may in
certain cases nevertheless result in the denial of protection of
constitutional rights. For when a litigant is challenging the constitutionality of the actions of a federal officer, often the only
available jurisdictional source is the federal question provision of
, Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 506.

Id. 519 (footnote omitted).
"' See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In Frontiero, plaintiff
attacked government regulations on the ground that they created a suspect classification.
The government defended on the ground that the differential treatment promoted
"administrative convenience." Id. at 688. The Court dismissed that contention, stating:
"[O]ur prior decisions make clear that, although efficacious administration of govern136

mental programs is not without some importance, 'The Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency.'" Id. at 690 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,

656 (1972)).

1975]

JURISDICTION OF LOWER FEDERAL COURTS

the Judicial Code, which imposes a minimum of $10,000.138 If,
as contended here, 39 state courts are unavailable to hear such
cases, this "neutral" congressional limitation on the federal
court's jurisdiction will deprive the litigant of any judicial forum
to adjudicate the claimed constitutional infringements. To the
litigant of such a claim, Congress' good faith in promoting efficiency and reducing the overloaded dockets of federal courts is
little consolation.
Furthermore, the arbitrariness of his "neutral scheme" exception finds no basis in the Constitution despite his assertion
that it is constitutionally permissible.' 40 Rather his argument
seems to come down to this: such congressional power should be
allowed because it will improve the judicial system, not because
the Constitution requires it. Nothing in the Constitution, especially article III, establishes efficiency and manageable case dockets as standards for congressional power. Nor can such factors be
read into the due process clause of the fifth amendment as the
sole standard on which to judge congressional power over federal jurisdiction.
The final criticism of Eisenberg's approach provides the
foundation for the theory presented in this Article. As is true of
Professor Hart's theory,14 ' Eisenberg fails to consider the impact
Tarble's Case would have when one of his permissible "neutral"
statutes caused a litigant seeking to enjoin a federal officer to
proceed in state court. It is difficult to see how such a statute
could be constitutionally permissible when the result would be to
leave such a litigant forumless. As is true of the other existing
theories on the subject of congressional control of lower federal
court jurisdiction, Eisenberg's failure to consider the impact of
Tarble's Case leaves his theory incomplete.

13828 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). Several other sources ofjurisdiction have been urged in
addition to the general federal question grant. Primary among these are section 10 of the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702-06 (1970), and the mandamus provision,
28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). Neither of these, however, has been firmly established as a
source of jurisdiction in federal officer cases.

1'9
See text accompanying notes 166-216 infra.
140Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 518. He states that "neutrality, efficiency, and some
weighing of interests" are "useful guidelines for Congress' exercise of its power" over
lower federal court jurisdiction. He, therefore, equates "useful" guidelines with
constitutional standards of congressional action.
141See notes 97-100 supra and accompanying text.
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THE NEW SYNTHESIS: RECONCILING THE MADISONIAN
COMPROMISE WITH TARBLE'S CASE

The traditional approaches to the subject of congressional
power over lower federal court jurisdiction have been shown to
be insufficient in providing a satisfactory resolution of the dilemma faced by a litigant who seeks to have legislation declared
unconstitutional when Congress has removed federal jurisdiction
over such cases. The theory advanced here will attempt to provide a logical constitutionally based resolution to the dilemma,
founded on the principle that the due process clause of the fifth
amendment limits congressional power in this area.
A.

The Right to an IndependentJudicial
Resolution of ConstitutionalClaims

The foundation upon which the synthesis here advanced is
based is the proposition that a litigant has a fifth amendment
right to an independent judicial hearing, state or federal, of a
142
constitutional claim.
In Crowell v. Benson, 143 Chief Justice Hughes stated a principle of enormous import: "In cases brought to enforce constitutional rights, the judicial power of the United States necessarily
extends to the independent determination of all questions, both
of fact and law, necessary to the performance of that supreme
function."'1 44 The Chief Justice thus recognized that when constitutional rights are in jeopardy the Constitution itself requires
that a court be made available to the litigant, and Congress can145
not prevent the litigant from obtaining a remedy.
142 The argument advanced here is limited to constitutional claims because Congress
arguably has power to prevent the adjudication of claims based upon statutorily created
rights. Unlike rights emanating from the Constitution, statutory rights exist at the discretion of Congress. Since Congress need not have created such rights, one can argue that it
completely controls those rights, and may determine whether they can be vindicated in
an independent judicial forum. Though this argument seems to make sense, its applicability is lessened by the developing judicial doctrine that significant statutory rights may
not be denied without due process of law. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
261-64 (1970). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
143285 U.S. 22 (1932).
144Id. at 60.
141Professor Louis Jaffe has maintained that Crowell supports his view that:
When adjudication seriously touches property or interests traditionally of great
moment, due process may require judicial process....
...
[W]hen a person is the object of an administrative order which will be
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The Crowell decision built upon another decision handed
146
down by the Court ten years earlier. In Ng Fung Ho v. White
aliens claiming to be citizens were issued an administrative
order of deportation. On a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme
Court held that due process entitled the claimant to an independent judicial determination on the issue of citizenship. Four
years after Crowell, the Court in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States' 4 7 was confronted with a rate order by the Secretary of
Agriculture which a three-judge district court had sustained over
the plaintiff's contention that it violated due process. The Court
affirmed, but Chief Justice Hughes took the opportunity to emphasize that an "independent judgment upon the facts" was constitutionally necessary. 1 48 Justice Brandeis concurred, stating:
"The supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity
to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was
applied .... To that extent, the person asserting a right, whatever its source, should be entitled to the independent judgment
149
of a court on the ultimate question of constitutionality."'
More recently courts have based the right to an independent
judicial forum within the ambit of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. In Boyd v. Clark'50 a three-judge district court
panel was faced with the prospect that the jurisdictional amount
requirement of section 1331 of the Judicial Code would cut the
plaintiffs off from a claim of governmental unfairness with no
enforced by a writ levying upon his property or person, he is at some point
entitled to a judicial test of legality ....
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 388 (1965). It is hard to imagine
a better example than a federal program that purportedly violates the litigant's constitutional rights.
It may seem inappropriate to employ Crowell to support a theory of due process,
when the case itself purported primarily to turn on considerations of separation of
powers. However, the distinction between these bases is often unclear, and often may
well overlap. See note 163 infra. As Professor Jaffe has noted, although Crowell "emphasizes separation-of-powers considerations... [it] does have a strong bvertone of due
process." L. JAFFE, supra, at 639.
146259 U.S. 276 (1922).
147298 U.S. 38 (1936).
148

Id. at 51-52. Professor Davis has suggested that, with the possible exception of Ng

Fung Ho, the Crowell line of cases establishing the doctrine of constitutional fact is all but
dead. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 540 (3d ed. 1972). Professor Davis may well
be correct. Cf. Hart, supra note 14, at 1375-79. But cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 148
(1964). But this in no way undermines the present contention that courts must be available to serve as the final arbiters of constitutional rights.
149298 U.S. at 84 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
150 287 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd on other grounds, 393 U.S. 316 (1969).
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situs of adjudication. Judge Edelstein, dissenting, believed that
result incompatible with the fifth amendment's guarantee of due
process. 15 1 Another court, in Murray v. Vaughn..1 52 insisted that
"[b]oth the Fifth Amendment and Article III, § 2 of the Constitution might well be abused if no avenue is opened for reyiew
1 53
by the courts of [a constitutional] claim."'
The Second Circuit in Battaglia v. General Motors Corp. 154
recognized that this right to an independent resolution limited
Congress' power "to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction
of courts other than the Supreme Court."'15 5 Congress could not
exercise its article III power, the court maintained, in a manner
that would "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or ...take private property without just
5 6
compensation."'
These and other courts have stated the broad proposition
that the fifth amendment requires an independent resolution of
constitutional claims. These courts, however, have failed to develop the underlying rationale for that fundamental principle.
The initial assumption that must be made to support this
proposition is the rather obvious one that neither the executive
nor Congress has authority to violate constitutional rights. From
this premise, the next step is the conclusion that if constitutional
rights are to retain any protection from attack by the majoritarian branches of government, those branches cannot themselves be the final arbiters of the meaning and scope of constitutional protections. If the very parties accused of threatening the
exercise of constitutional rights retain final power to decide
whether they have in fact violated those rights, the rights have,
for all practical purposes, been rendered worthless. 1 57 To en151Id. at 568 (dissenting opinion).
152300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.I. 1969).
15
3 Id. at 695.
154 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948).
155
Id. at 257.
156 Id.
157 The Supreme Court has recognized that a judge who retains a direct interest in
the outcome of a litigation is incapable of fairly adjudicating a case. Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510 (1927). Similarly, executive or legislative bodies obviously have an interest in the
determination whether their own acts or programs are unconstitutional.
The Court has many times pointed out that the article III protections of tenure and
compensation for federal judges are meant to assure the independence of the judiciary,
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933); are in the public interest, Evans v.
Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920); and were designed to give judges maximum freedom from
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trust final power to interpret constitutional rights to the majoritarian branches effectively eliminates those rights, 158 thus violating our initial, incontestable premise: that the majoritarian
59
branches have no power to violate constitutional rights.'
Even if we were to engage in the unlikely assumption that in
many cases executive or legislative officials actually could fairly
and properly determine which of their acts are unconstitutional,
the appearance of fairness is as vitally important to the continued legitimacy of government as is fairness itself. Even if the
constitutional decisions of executive or legislative representatives
were as objective as those of independent decision-makers, there
could be no way to assure the public that the decisions of noncoercion and influence by the executive and legislative branches, United States ex rel.
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). See generally Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389,
406 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit
of the United States, 382 U.S. 1003, 1005 (1966).
158 For instance, the Supreme Court in a recent decision held that a provision of the
Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970), was unconstitutional
because it permitted the Attorney General, rather than an independent judicial officer,
to determine whether search warrants should issue in cases involving national security
surveillance. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). The
Court on other occasions has reiterated the principle that a detached, independent judicial officer must issue a search warrant See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973);
Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971). In Coolidge, the Court stated that "prosecutors and policemen simply cannot
be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality [to make the determination of whether there
is probable cause to issue warrants] with regard to their own investigations-the 'competitive enterprise' that must rightly engage their single-minded attention." Id. at 450.
159It might, of course, be argued that under some circumstances courts are called
upon to determine the constitutionality of their own actions and, therefore, are not
neutral and detached. The most obvious example is that in which a court engages in
summary contempt proceedings and is, in the final analysis, the "judge" of the validity of
its own actions. A simple answer is that, unlike the executive and the legislature, courts
do not have the same investment and interest in their actions; courts do not create
programs and take a vested interest in their operation. When they do, as in the contempt
area, it is now wisely held that in most cases the judge who was the victim of the contempt
may not conduct defendant's contempt trial. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974);
FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-26 (1969). However, it could be argued that courts do "create" "rights," see, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), and, to the extent they do, are very much interested in what happens to
their creations. Whether this is the type of interest that should cause concern is open to
question. It must be remembered that the framers created the judiciary to be a check on
the other two branches of government. The other two branches, unlike the judiciary, can
take the initiative and create rights, liabilities, and programs themselves while courts are
limited by the very structure of the judicial system. To the extent that they do create
rights and have a vested interest in preserving their creations, appellate review serves as
an internal check not present in the executive or legislative branches. In this way, the
danger of courts' losing the requisite impartiality is hopefully diminished. See Carrington,
Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the
National Law, 82 HARV. L. REv. 542, 550-51 (1969).
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independent officials had been reached fairly and impartially.
This concern for the appearance of fairness was manifested
in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok. 160 There petitioners questioned the
power ofjudges of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals to sit on the lower federal courts by designation. Arguing that they had been denied the protection of judges
with tenure and compensation guaranteed by article III,
petitioners sought reversal of judgments against them because
of the participation of those judges in the decision-making
process. 16 1 Justice Harlan's plurality opinion noted at the outset
that
[n]o contention is made that either Judge... displayed
a lack of appropriate judicial independence, or that
either sought by his rulings to curry favor with Congress or the Executive. . . . and were it not for the
explicit provisions of Article III we should be quite
unable to say that either judge's participation even
colorably denied the petitioners independent judicial hearings. 162
Despite this apparent absence of any allegation of specific impropriety, the Court assumed that if the judges in question were
not article III judges and therefore lacked the independence of
the protections of article III, the litigants could rightfully complain of their presence in the adjudication of their cases.16 3
160 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
161Id. at 532-33.
162 Id. at 533.
6' Justice Harlan ultimately concluded that the Court of Claims and the Court of

Customs and Patent Appeals are article III courts. Id. at 584.
As is the case with our reliance on Crowell, it may seem strange to rely in a due
process analysis on a doctrine, such as that of Glidden, which purports to turn on principles of separation of powers. However, the basis of the legislative court doctrine expounded upon in Glidden, though starting with separation-of-powers concepts, may ultimately reach a twilight zone of due process. In Glidden the Court recognized that there
could exist substantial overlap in matters capable of being heard by article III courts and
those by article I courts. But the plurality opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan left open the
question to what extent "Congress may commit the execution of... 'inherently' judicial
business to tribunals other than Article III courts." Id. at 549. The opinion made no
effort to define this term. A similar phrase had been employed by the Court in Ex parte
Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 453 (1929), where, in holding that the-Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals was not an article III court (a conclusion rejected by Glidden), it
stated: "The matters made cognizable therein include nothing which inherently or necessarily requires judicial determination." One commentator has suggested that this
inherently judicial area includes those "cases in which the parties have a constitutional
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Were it not for the potential obstacles posed by Tarble's Case
and its progeny, the provisions of article III and the terms of the
Madisonian Compromise would present no problems for the
concept of an independent judicial forum. The tenure and
salaries of state judges can no more be impinged by Congress
than can those of federal judges.16 4 As will be seen in the following sections, however, the conceptual and practical difficulties
presented by Tarble's Case and its progeny are quite real and
the appropriate
have too often been ignored in determining
65
scope of Congress' article III power.'
B.

The Power of State Courts
over Federal Officers

When an individual contests the constitutionality of a federal program, he often must seek injunctive relief against a federal official to restrain the exercise of statutory duties under the
program and thereby halt the program's operation.' 66 Since a
litigant of such a constitutional claim has a due process right to
an independent judicial hearing of that claim,' 67 he ordinarily
has the choice to proceed, under the Madisonian Compromise,
in either state or federal court.' 68 However, it will be argued
here that, despite the apparent impact of the Madisonian Compromise on this choice of forum, it should be found that state
courts lack power under Tarble's Case to enjoin federal officers.
State court jurisdiction over federal officials varies dependright to a judicial hearing." Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 HARV. L. Rav. 894, 917
(1930). In this sense, then, it may be that the separation-of-powers requirement read into
article III and the dictates of due process tend to overlap.
164
See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 212 (1971) (congressional power
over state courts and judges limited by Constitution).
165
See text accompanying notes 166-246 infra.
166It might appear that the availability of a declaratory judgment under various state
statutes is an exception to this proposition. To the extent that it is, it does not undermine
the basic argument. It is only when state interference is of a substantial nature, truly
interfering with the operation of a federal program, that state court power is forbidden
by Tarble's Case. See notes 247-50 infra and accompanying text. To provide that declaratory judgment with "teeth," however, some type of injunctive relief is usually also sought.
See Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity,
Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1479, 1481 (1962). It is this injunctive
relief that is of initial and primary concern here. It is the factor which is at the heart of
the new synthesis.
167See text accompanying notes 142-65 supra.
168 This assumes, of course, that Congress has not explicitly directed that one or the
other forum be exclusively employed. In such a case, because the litigant has an independent judicial forum, he is afforded due process. See note 244 infra.
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ing upon the remedy sought by a plaintiff and the nature of the
federal officer's actions under attack. 16 9 State courts clearly have
power to impose personal liability upon federal officers. Such
power is manifested in state criminal prosecutions, 17 0 suits for
damages, 17 1 and actions to recover property. 72 Thus federal officers are not immune from state criminal prosecutions for the
violation of valid state penal laws, nor are they immune from
certain state civil suits brought by private individuals. But these
suits are in response to actions by a federal officer outside the
scope of his authority or apart from the performance of his
statutory duties. Such state court power is invoked upon a federal officer for acts done as a civilian for which any other individual would be liable. Any resultant impingement of the official
duties of federal officers is, at most, indirect.
At the other extreme is the clear law providing that federal
officers cannot be issued writs of mandamus17 3 or habeas
corpus 7 4 by state courts. From early in the nation's history it has
been undisputed that state courts are without such power. State
court power to grant injunctive relief against federal officers lies
75
somewhere between the above two extremes.'
1. The Mandamus Power
In 1821, the Supreme Court denied a state court the power
to mandamus a federal officer. In McClung v. Silliman,17 6 the
169 See generally 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE,
0.6(5), at 249-50 (2d ed. 1974);
Arnold, The Powerof State Courts to Enjoin Federal Officers, 73 YALE L.J. 1385, 1386 (1964);
Bishop, The Jurisdiction of State and Federal Courts Over Federal Officers, 9 COLUM. L.
REV. 397 (1909).
170See Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510 (1932); Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9
(1926); Oklahoma v. Willingham, 143 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Okla. 1956). Federal officers,
however, have the right to remove state court criminal proceedings to federal court, 28
U.S.C. § 1442 (1970); see Bock v. Perkins, 139 U.S. 628 (1891).
171See Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900); Etheridge v. Sperry, 139 U.S. 266
(1891); Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334 (1866); Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
284 (1851); Kendall v. Stokes 44 U.S. (3 How.) 86 (1845); Raisler v. Oliver & Co., 97 Ala.
710, 12 So. 238 (1893); Williams v. McDaniel, 80 Ga. App. 614, 56 S.E/2d 926 (1949).
172 See Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196
(1882); Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1 (1817). But see Stanley v. Schwalby, 162
U.S. 255 (1896) (such actions may not be brought in state courts if United States is
indispensable party).
173See generally 1 J. MOORE, supra note 169, 0.6(5), at 243-46; Arnold, supra note
169, at 1391-93; Bishop, supra note 169, at 415-16.
174 See generally I J. MOORE, supra note 169, 0.6(5), at 241-43; Arnold, supra note
169, at 1386-91; Bishop, supra note 169, at 403-10.

175See Arnold, supra note 169, at 1386.

176 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821).
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plaintiff had sought a writ of mandamus from the federal circuit court in Ohio to order the federal land registrar to issue a
certificate of purchase to him. The power of the federal court to
issue the writ had been denied in Mclntire v. Wood 17 7 and plaintiff therefore brought a mandamus action for the same relief in
Ohio state court. The Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the lower
state court's jurisdiction to issue the writ, but the United States
Supreme Court held that the federal officer's conduct could
only be controlled by the power that created him; whatever doubts have from time to time been suggested, as
to the supremacy of the United States, in its legislative,
judicial or executive powers, no one has ever contested
its supreme8 right to dispose of its own property in its
17
own way.
McClung was relied upon in a series of New York cases over
120 years later. The line of decisions began with Armand Schmoll,
Inc. v. FederalReserve Bank, 7 9 in which the plaintiff brought suit
in state court to compel the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
City to perform a duty allegedly required of it under federal law.
The New York Court of Appeals dismissed the suit for lack of
jurisdiction, stating:
The right of a state court, in many cases, to vindicate and protect rights granted by a federal statute or to
give redress for wrongs committed by a federal officer
under color of authority granted by federal statute,
cannot be doubted .... It is to be noted, however, that
• . . there are fields from which the state courts are
excluded.180
The court refrained from assuming power to direct federal officials in the performance of their functions: "Assumption of such
power would hamper orderly government and ignore the division of the fields of government of state and nation created by
the Constitution."'18
The court was careful to draw the precise issue at hand and
to limit the scope of its decision. The question before it was not
177 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813).
178 19 U.S. at 605.
17 286 N.Y. 503, 37 N.E.2d 225 (1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 818 (1942).
180 Id. at 508, 37 N.E.2d at 226.
181 Id. at 509, 37 N.E.2d at 226-27.
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whether federal statutory rights could be litigated in a state court
but rather
whether the manner of performance of a specific federal government statutory function by a federal statutory agency can be the subject of a decree of a state
court. This case does not involve any encroachment
upon the state's authority by a federal agency; or any
power given by the Congress to a state court to interpret a state law; or a suit against individual federal officers who are-allegedly infringing upon
the rights of an
182
individual in violation of their duties.
The decisions since Armand Scholl reaffirm the general
proposition that state courts have no power to issue writs of
mandamus to federal officials.' 83 The most prominent commentator on the subject of state court power over federal officers,
after reviewing the mandamus cases, stated emphatically that
"there is no good reason to predict that McClung will not govern
whenever a plaintiff makes the mistake of labeling his papers
'mandamus.' "184
2. The Habeas Power
While the Supreme Court's first indication of a restrictive
view of state court power over federal officials came in a mandamus case, McClung v. Silliman,' 85 the Court's major pro86
nouncement of policy came after the Civil War in Tarble's Case.'
Although Tarble's Case involved a state court's power to issue a
writ of habeas corpus for an individual held in federal custody,
its statements against state court interference with the operation
182 Id. at 508, 37 N.E.2d at 226.
83
' See Wasservogel v. Meyerowitz, 300 N.Y. 125, 89 N.E.2d 712 (1949); Hunter v.
City of New York, 121 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Fox v. 34 Hillside Realty Corp., 87
N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd, 276 App. Div. 994, 95 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1950).
The court in Armand Schmoll seemingly drew a distinction between federal officers
who were infringing the rights of a person "in violation of their duties" and "in accordance with their duties." This distinction began to fade in later cases since the distinction
could only be made by way of a hearing in state court.
184Arnold, supra note 169, at 1392. But see Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota ex rel.
Langer, 250 U.S. 135, 151-52 (1919). Langer is a mysterious case, the Court permitting a
state court to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal officer without raising the McClung
decision.
18519 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821).
18680 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).
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of the federal government have profound impact outside the
habeas situation.
Tarble's Case was preceded by the pre-Civil War decision of
Ableman v. Booth. 187 In Ableman, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
had twice ordered the release of a federal prisoner by issuing
writs of habeas corpus to the federal officers holding him. Chief
Justice Taney, speaking for a unanimous Court, declared that
state courts were without power to issue writs of habeas corpus
for federal prisoners even though they were allegedly held in
violation of federal law.
The Chief Justice was well aware of the state of affairs facing the nation at the time. A civil war was on the horizon, the
Confederacy was forming, and Fort Sumter was to be bombarded within three years after the decision was handed down. It
was this state of affairs that led him to maintain that the answer
to the asserted state court power was abundantly clear:
[N]o one will suppose that a Government which has
now lasted nearly seventy years, enforcing its laws by its
own tribunals, and preserving the union of the States,
could have lasted a single year, or fulfilled the high
trusts committed to it, if offences against its laws could
the consent of the State
not have been punished without 88
in which the culprit was found.'
The basis for denying state court power was the sovereignty
of the two governments. There could be "no such thing as judicial authority," Taney maintained, unless it was "conferred by a
Government or sovereignty."' 8 9 It was clear to him that the federal government had not granted such power, and clearly the
state could not grant itself such power, "for no State can authorize one of its judges or courts to exercise judicial power, by
habeas corpus or otherwise, within the jurisdiction of another and
independent Government."' 90 The Chief Justice found the
reason for this in the Constitution itself:
The Constitution was . . formed ... mainly to secure
union and harmony at home [and] it was felt by the
187 62
18

U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).

1Id. at 515.
89
1 0 Id.
9 Id. at 515-16.
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statesmen who framed the Constitution, and by the
people who adopted it, that it was necessary that many
of the rights of sovereignty which the States then possessed should be ceded to the General Government;
and that, in the sphere of action assigned to it, it should
be supreme, and strong enough to execute its own laws
by its own tribunals, without interruption from a State
or from State authorities. 19 '
This removal of state court competence over federal officials
was necessary, the Court felt, to insure uniformity of interpretation of federal laws and to prevent local prejudices from being
embedded in federal law.' 92 And even though the Civil War was
imminent, the Court emphasized the importance of a federal
judiciary with exclusive power to direct the course of federal
affairs. This was so or else "the supremacy . . . so carefully
provided in . . . the Constitution . . . could not possibly be
maintained peacefully ....
Of course, the events following Ableman carried out the
worst fears behind the decision. The supremacy of the Constitution over state power was chiseled into the law by a long and
bitter conflict on the battlefield rather than by peaceful judicial
pronouncements. Looking back on the long struggle and reconstruction, the Supreme Court handed down the decision in
Tarble's Case. With the events of the past 50 years setting the
stage for the decision, the Court declared a philosophy of
federal-state relations that would have a great impact on the
development of the reconstructed union.
In Tarble's Case, a Wisconsin state court had issued a writ of
habeas corpus to the United States Army ordering the release of
an allegedly under-age enlistee. The Court denied such power to
the state courts, basing its holding, as in Ableman, upon the
sovereignty of the federal government and the supremacy of its
laws under the Constitution. It was essential, the Court felt, that
neither of the two governments "intrude within the jurisdiction,
or authorize any interference therein by its judicial officers with
the action of the other.' 9 4 The enactments of the federal gov191Id. at 517.
192Id. at 517-18.

193Id. at 518.
194 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 406.
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ernment must be supreme, the Court insisted, because that was
"essential to the preservation of order and peace, and the avoid195
ance of forcible collision between the two governments."'
Having thus analyzed the relationship between the two governments, the Court broadly asserted that "within their respective spheres of action, it follows that neither can intrude with its
judicial process into the domain of the other, except so far as
such intrusion may be necessary on the part of the National
government to preserve its rightful supremacy in cases of conflict of authority."' 96 The Court stressed the degree of interference state habeas power would entail, resulting in great injury to
the public.' 97 The Court feared that if granted such power, state
courts could invariably halt the operation of the federal government. "In many exigencies the measures of the National government might . . . be entirely bereft of their efficacy and
value."' 98 An appeal to the Court would be an inadequate
safeguard because habeas proceedings are summary and the
delay incident to the appeal process would be great. 9 9 Meanwhile the damage would have already taken place: "It is manifest
that the powers of the National government could not be exercised with energy and efficiency at all times, if its acts could be
interfered with and controlled for any period by officers or tribunals of another sovereignty. '20 0
The Court in Tarble's Case spoke inbroad terms and defined
a doctrine that would be carried beyond the habeas situation by
1 5

1 Id. at 407.
196 Id.
7
19 Id. at 408-09.

198 Id. at 409.
199 Id.

200Id. One last decision supports the proposition advanced here and provides
further indication of the great interference such state court power causes. In United
States ex rel. Fort v. Meiszner, 319 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Ill. 1970), the petitioner, a federal
prisoner, sought to enjoin the execution of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued
by the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. Judge Robson of the federal district court
enjoined the state court and, relying upon Ableman and Tarble's Case, stated: "It is a
well-worn doctrine that a state court lacks any jurisdictional authority to issue state
process upon a federal officer who is acting pursuant to federal law." Id. at 695. Judge
Robson spoke of the weight of the two decisions despite their age: "These decisions have
not been challenged or even questioned during the century that has elapsed since they
were rendered, but they have been cited as respected authority on issues concerning the
supremacy of federal law over conflicting state law in a number of subsequent Supreme
Court decisions." Id. at 695-96. The court concluded that the Illinois court "lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus.., upon a federal marshal having custody of the
petitioner under an order issued by a federal court." Id. at 696.
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later courts.2 0 Other courts have relied upon Tarble's Case for
the proposition that state courts lack power to interfere in the
workings of the federal government by enjoining the actions of
02
federal officials.1
3. The Injunctive Power
At first glance, it seems reasonable that, since the touchstone
of McClung and Tarble's Case was state court interference with
federal action, the reasoning of those cases should readily carry
over to and therefore forbid state court injunctive power over
federal officials. But the development of the law in the area has
not been so clear. While various commentators have argued in
the past that the rationale of the mandamus and habeas situations should not apply to injuctive power, 2 0 3 it is submitted here
that a stronger case exists for forbidding injunctive power than
for disallowing habeas power.
It has frequently been noted that the Supreme Court has
not decided the question whether state courts have jurisdiction
201 See, e.g., Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds,
447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972); Perez v. Rhiddlehoover,
247 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. La. 1965); Parry v. Delaney, 310 Mass. 107, 37 N.E.2d 249 (1941).
202 A series of cases exists, however, that is out of line with the weight of authority
holding that state courts lack power to interfere with federal officials. See Missouri ex rel.
Burnes Nat'l Bank v. Duncan, 265 U.S. 17 (1924); First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S.
640 (1924); First Nat'l Bank v. Fellows ex rel. Union Trust Co., 244 U.S. 416 (1917); Perez
v. Rhiddlehoover, 247 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. La. 1965).
In First National Bank v. Missouri, the state sued the defendant bank because it
opened a branch in violation of state law but pursuant to federal law. Suit was brought in
state court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, three Justices stated their opinion that
Tarble's Case barred the state court action, 263 U.S. at 666-67 (Van Devanter, J., dissenting). The majority of the Court, however, disagreed, stating that while national banks
were federal instrumentalities, they were still subject to general laws of the state not
inconsistent with federal policy or law.
In Perez, the district attorney of a Louisiana parish sought to enjoin federal voting
examiners from registering voters who did not meet certain requirements of state law.
The defendants removed the action to federal court. The court held that the state court
had jurisdiction, finding that in the Voting Rights Act, Congress specifically required the
federal examiners to comply with state law. The court interpreted this as impliedly
authorizing actions in state courts to determine whether state laws are being followed.
247 F. Supp. at 73-74. This reasoning is unjustifiable. Federal supremacy is necessarily
threatened whenever a state court asserts power to direct the actions of federal officials.
Furthermore, the determination of whether the applicable state law "does not unduly
interfere with federal authority or threaten federal supremacy" is precisely the function
that should be performed by federal courts.
203 See Arnold, supra note 169, at 1386.
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to enjoin federal officers. 20 4 In Keely v. Sanders,2 °5 however, the
Court by way of dictum stated that "no State court could, by
injunction or otherwise, prevent Federal officers from collecting
Federal taxes. ' 20 6 The weight of reasoned opinion emanating
from the state and lower federal courts supports the general
denial of such state court power. Most decisions note the questionable status of the law; 20 7 few cases maintain the existence of
20
unfettered power in the state courts.
A series of decisions from the South in the early 1960's
supports the argument that state courts lack power to enjoin
federal officers. Many suits were brought in various friendly
state courts by individuals seeking to hinder the operation of the
many civil rights statutes enacted by Congress during the Ken204 See, e.g., id. 1397.

205 99 U.S. 441 (1879).
206 Id. at 443.

207 Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 664 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting); McGaw
v. Farrow, 472 F.2d 952, 955 (4th Cir. 1973); Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688, 695
(D.R.I. 1969).
208 See, e.g., Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047, 1050 (3d Cir.), stay denied, 409 U.S. 971
(1972).
In Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. McGinnes, 179 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa.
1959), aff'd per curiam, 278 F.2d 330 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 820 (1960), the state
commission claimed that one of the defendants, a federal taxpayer, had defrauded it of
one million dollars. The commission alleged that the money had been remitted to the
defendant McGinnes, the district director of the Internal Revenue Service, in payment of
federal taxes. The commission further alleged that the funds were to be returned to the
taxpayer by IRS, asserting that, if IRS were allowed to return the funds, the taxpayer
would spend them before the commission could bring suit and levy upon them. The
commission, therefore, sought to enjoin McGinnes from refunding the moneys and to
obtain an order directing their payment to the commission.
The suit was first initiated in federal district court but was dismissed for lack of
original jurisdiction. 268 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1959), rev'g 169 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Pa. 1958),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959) (claim did not "arise under" federal law within meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970)). The commission thereupon proceeded in state court and
defendant removed the action to federal court and moved for its dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction. Since upon removal a federal district court's jurisdiction is derivative from
the state court's jurisdiction, see Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 258 U.S.
377, 382 (1922), the court examined the jurisdiction of the state court from which the
action had been removed:
The question of whether a State court has jurisdiction to enjoin a Federal officer
in the performance of his duty has not been squarely passed upon by the
Supreme Court .... However, those cases which do touch on this delicate issue
indicate a doubt as to the existence of such a jurisdiction.
179 F. Supp. at 580.
The court relied on the language in Tarble's Case concerning the requirement of
non-interference by one sovereign in the affairs of another sovereign. See also Parry v.
Delaney, 310 Mass. 107, 37 N.E.2d 249 (1941).
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nedy and Johnson Administrations. One such statute under attack in state courts was Title III of the Civil Rights Act of
1960.209 In Alabama ex rel. Gallion v. Rogers 2 10 the board of registrars of Montgomery County, Alabama, sought to enjoin the
Attorney General of the United States from inspecting state voting records on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional.
The Alabama Attorney General obtained a temporary injunction
and restraining order from the Circuit Court of Montgomery
County. The order forbade Attorney General Rogers and his
"agents, servants, employees and attorneys" to inspect or copy
the county board's records "under the color of authority purportedly given ... by the 'Civil Rights Act of 1960'.11211
The state court action was removed to federal district court
by the Government and there Judge Johnson emphatically denied any such power in the state courts. After finding that
nothing in Title III of the Act vested concurrent jurisdiction in
state courts, the court denied the existence of any implied power
to do so. Relying upon Tarble's Case and Keely v. Sanders, the
court stated:
Such action by-t-he state courts in matters exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal courts cannot be tolerated without there being created frustration
of national purposes....
. . .Aside from the fact that the jurisdiction conferred by Section 305 of the Act is exclusively vested in
the United States district courts, the state court action
in issuing its injunction ...was in violation of the basic
legal principle that state courts are without jurisdiction
to review the discretion or enjoin the acts of federal
12
officers.

2

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the court's deci2 13
sion with little comment.
20942 U.S.C. § 197 4-74e (1970).
210187 F. Supp. 848 (M.D. Ala. 1960), affd per curiam, 285 F.2d 430 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied,
366 U.S. 913 (1961).
211
Id. at 851.
212
Id.at 852.
213 285 F.2d 430 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 913 (1961). Later that year, the same
federal district court was faced with an injunction granted by the same state court in
defiance of the Rogers decision. Alabama ex rel. Patterson v. Jones, 189 F. Supp. 61 (M.D.
Ala. 1960). In Jones the United States Civil Service Commission had filed a "letter of
Charges" against the Director of the Alabama state highway department for his participa-
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Thus although there has been no definitive determination
of whether Tarble's Case and McClung apply as well to limit state
court injunctive power, substantial precedent exists for the
proposition that it does. Given the primary basis of Tarble's Case,
it is difficult to understand why there should be any question
regarding the lack of state court injunctive power over federal
officials. If interference by one sovereign in the affairs of
another sovereign is the touchstone for restricting state court
power, 21 4 it is evident that injunctive power should be denied to
state courts. Mandamus power was rejected in McClung and
habeas power in Tarble's Case basically because the Supreme
Court felt that in each situation such power permitted state
courts to interfere in the exercise and enforcement of federal
statutes, a power deemed repugnant to the federal system. Such
interference clearly results to a much greater degree when a
state court exercises injunctive powers over federal officers.
Rather than requiring an act to be performed, which is the result
of the mandamus power, a state court can impede and even halt
the operation of essential federal functions by the use of the
injunctive power. Any argument that state courts should have
injunctive power over federal officers must fall when the impact
of such power is considered in light of McClung and Tarble's Case.
The Supreme Court, surprisingly, has yet to address the
issue specifically. 215 This absence of a Supreme Court decision
tion in political activities in violation of the Hatch Act. The plaintiff highway department
obtained an injunction from the Circuit Court of Montgomery County forbidding the

Commission from filing the charges. The Commission removed the action to federal
district court, where Judge Johnson reprimanded the same state court for the second
time within a year: "It is quite apparent from the appropriate authorities-recently cited
by this Court several times-that a State court does not have the authority to review the

exercise of discretion by federal officers in the performance of their official duties." Id. at
63-64.
One year later the Fifth Circuit took the occasion to reaffirm the position advanced
by Judge Johnson in Rogers andJones. Kennedy v. Bruce, 298 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1962).
214 See generally 1J. MOORE, supra note 169, 0.6(5), at 240; Arnold, supra note 169,
at 1386.
215 See Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354 (1941), where the Court reviewed a state court
injunction against a federal officer on its merits but refused to decide the question of
state court power because the case could be decided on other grounds: "Since jurisdiction
and the procedure of the court below are sustained by decisions of this Court, we are
unwilling to base our judgment upon a resolution of asserted conflict touching issues of
so grave consequence, where, as here, the bill fails to make a case upon the merits." Id. at
360.
The issue has only been referred to in a footnote by a dissenting Justice. In Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963), Justice Brennan stated that "it is unsettled whether
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on the question, however, should not be deemed dispositive. 21 6
Rather, the weight of the existing state and lower federal court
authority appears to be firmly against the existence of such
power.
the state courts have jurisdiction to entertain an action to enjoin a federal officer acting
under color of federal law .... so that denial of federal court jurisdiction over claims
such as petitioner's might leave an injured party totally remediless." Id. at 664-65 n.13
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
216 Noting that the Supreme Court has not decided the question, Bator proposes an
analytical framework for the Court when and if the time comes:
When the Supreme Court is called on to resolve the issue, what weight should it
accord to the following consideration: (a) the similarity and dissimilarity of
mandamus, habeas corpus, and injunction; (b) the fact that Congress has provided for removal from state courts of certain actions against federal officials; (c)
the fact that prior to 1875 the lower federal courts had no general jurisdiction of
actions arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States and that, with
some exceptions, their jurisdiction in such cases is now limited to cases that
involve the jurisdictional amount... ; (d) the fact that since 1937 Congress has
forbidden district courts to grant an interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement or operation of an act of Congress on the ground of
its unconstitutionality unless the suit is heard by three judges, at least one of
whom is a circuit judge; and that a direct appeal has been provided from the
three judge court to the Supreme Court ... ; and (e) the fact that Congress has
not legislated against state court injunctions?
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 430 (footnotes omitted).
When the Supreme Court does resolve the question of state court power to enjoin
federal officers, it should decide that state courts completely lack such power. The similarity in the danger of state interference common to mandamus, habeas, and injunctive
relief calls for common treatment. All three have great potential for inflicting lasting
injury to federal programs. Therefore, in answering the injunctive power question, the
Court should follow its prior decisions in McClung, Ableman, and Tarble's Case.
The fact that Congress has provided for removal of state actions against federal
officials should not sway the court. The initial action in state court will cause enough
interference that subsequent removal will be "too little too late." Cases such as Alabama ex
rel. Gallion v. Rogers and Kennedy v. Bruce show that interference occurs when the state
court action commences and that removal often comes after the harm has been inflicted.
That lower federal courts were not given federal question jurisdiction until 1875
does not weaken the argument against state court power. The granting of broad federal
question jurisdiction is a manifestation of Congress' belief that after the Civil War federal
interest adjudication belonged in federal courts and not state courts. See note 236 infra.
That Congress has imposed the three-judge requirement on federal courts enjoining
federal officers also lends support for the argument that state courts should be denied
the power. If the exercise of the power over federal officials in connection with constitutional attacks on federal statutes is so sensitive that Congress requires three federal
judges, one state judge clearly should not possess equal power.
Finally, that Congress has not legislated against state injunctive power should not be
accorded any weight. Silence by Congress in the face of decisions such as McClung,
Ableman, and Tarble's Case should not be interpreted to mean that Congress feels no
legislation is necessary. Inferring action by Congress from its silence and inaction is
dangerous. See Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). But see
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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C. The Reconciliation: The Modern Validity of
Tarble's Case and Its Relation to Congressional
Power over Lower Federal CourtJurisdiction
The fundamental conclusion reached to this point should
now be clear: There exists a due process right to an independent
judicial determination of constitutional rights; so long as the
state courts remain open, as contemplated by the Madisonian
Compromise, congressional limitations on lower federal court
jurisdiction do not violate this precept of due process. If, however, for some reason the state courts no longer remain as a
viable alternative for the adjudication of constitutional rights, an
exclusion of federal court jurisdiction effectively denies access to
an independent judicial forum. Thus in these cases Congress'
power under article III is limited by the terms of the fifth
amendment, just as any provision in the body of the Constitution
may be limited or altered by a constitutional amendment. Since
under the logic and holding of cases like Tarble's Case state courts
have no power to control directly the acts of federal officers,2 1 7
a congressional preclusion of federal court review of the constitutionality of acts of federal officers violates the fifth amendment rights of one who would sue to control the acts of those
officers.
Several lower federal courts have reached a conclusion
similar to the one just described.1 18 In all candor, however,
though this ultimate conclusion is a correct one, the issue is significantly more complex than the reasoning in the preceding
paragraph and in the court decisions recognizes. On several
bases it is possible to argue that Tarble's Case has either little
or no effect on Congress' present day power to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. No analysis of the problem
would be complete without thorough examination of these arguments.
Text accompanying notes 166-216 supra.
See, e.g., Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds,
447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972); West End Neighborhood
Corp. v. Stans, 312 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1970); Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688
(D.R.I. 1969); Boyd v. Clark, 287 F. Supp. 561, 564-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (Edelstein, J.,
dissenting), aff'd mem. 393 U.S. 316 (1969). But see Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,
405 U.S. 538 (1972) (dictum); McGaw v. Farrow, 472 F.2d 952 (4th Cir. 1973); Spock v.
David, 469 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir.), stay denied, 409 U.S. 971 (1972).
217
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1. The Validity of Tarble's Case Reconsidered
One such argument has already been considered at
length. 2 19 This is the contention that Tarble's Case was purely a
habeas case and in no way limits the injunctive power of state
courts to control the actions of federal officers. As noted previously, the concern that led to the decision in Tarble's
Case-namely, the fear of undue state interference with the conduct of federal affairs-applies with equal if not greater force to
the area of injunctive power.
There are more serious concerns, however. First, it could
be argued that Tarble's Case was decided in the context of a
pre-existing adequate remedy in the federal courts, a point specifically noted by the Supreme Court in its opinion, 2 20 and therefore the decision was never intended to stand if no viable alternative existed in the federal courts. Second, it could be argued
that in any event the decision in Tarble's Case totally misconceived
the concept of federal supremacy and the intended role of the
state courts within the federal system and, therefore, should be
overruled. If either of these arguments were accepted, of course,
the theory developed here, premised as it is on the unavailability
of an adequate forum in the state courts, would fall. It is our
contention, however, that neither is accurate.
It is true, as mentioned above, that the Court noted in
Tarble's Case that
[t]he United States are as much interested in protecting
the citizen from illegal restraint under their authority,
as the several States are to protect him from the like
restraint under their authority, and are no more likely
to tolerate any oppression. Their courts and judicial officers are clothed with the power to issue the writ of
habeas corpus in all cases, where a party is illegally restrained of his liberty by any officer of the United States
.... And there is no just reason to believe that they will
exhibit any hestitation to exert their power, when it is
properly invoked. 2 2 1
Despite this language, however, the overwhelming thrust of the
Court's opinion leads to the inescapable conclusion that the exis219 Text accompanying note 214 supra.
220 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 411.
221 Id.
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tence of an adequate federal remedy was irrelevant to the decision. The Court emphasized throughout that "[t]here are within
the territorial limits of each State two governments, restricted in
their spheres of action, but independent of each other, and supreme within their respective spheres. 2 22 An analogy employed
first by the Court in Ableman and later quoted approvingly in
Tarble's Case is instructive. The State of Wisconsin, said the
Court, "had no more power to authorize these proceedings of its
judges and courts, than it would have had if the prisoner had
been confined in Michigan, or in any other State of the Union,
for an offence against the laws of the State in which he was
imprisoned. '223 If the courts of Michigan had in such a
hypothetical situation been unconstitutionally closed by the legislature, certainly the Wisconsin state courts would have had no
greater authority to interfere with the Michigan processes. Since
the Court viewed the state-federal judicial hierarchy as identical
to the relationship of one state's courts to those of another, it
seems clear that the reference at the close of its opinion to the
existence of an adequate federal remedy was nothing more than
gratuitous "icing on the cake," unnecessary to the Court's central
decision.
22

22 4

Id. at 406. One portion of the Court's opinion in Tarble's Case may create doubt as
to the strict demarcation the Court seemed to be drawing between state and federal
power. The state court, Justice Field stated, may require the marshal to produce the
process or orders under which the prisoner is held, "in order that the court or judge
issuing the writ may see that the prisoner is held by the officer, in good faith, under the
authority, or claim and color of the authority, of the United States, and not under the
mere pretence of having such authority." Id. at 409-10. This language, especially the
Court's reference to the officer's "good faith," could conceivably be construed to allow
the state courts significant power to question the reasons for the federal detention. But
such an interpretation would fly in the face of the Court's extended discussion of the
"distinct sovereignty" theory, under which the state courts have no power to control or
review the actions of a separate sovereign. The excerpt in question, then, seems to mean
only that the state court has power to ascertain that the detention actually is by the
United States, and not merely by someone falsely claiming to act on behalf of the United
States. "But," as the Court adds, "after the return is made, and the State judge or court
judicially apprised that the party is in custody under the authority of the United States,
they can proceed no further." Id. at 410. In this context, it is important to emphasize that
according to the Court, if it appears in the habeas application that the prisoner "is
confined under the authority, or claim and color of the authority, of the United States
... the writ should be refused." Id. at 409.
223
Id. at 406 (quoting Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858)).
224 It might be argued that in light of the constitutional mandate that habeas corpus
not be suspended, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, Tarble's Case must be read as presuming the
existence of an adequate remedy in federal court. Since the body of the Constitution
provides simultaneously that habeas corpus may not be suspended and that Congress
need not create lower federal courts, it must be assumed that the framers contemplated
2
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One may respond, however, that the Court's analogy points
up the fundamental fallacies in its opinion: The right of a state
court to regulate the actions of federal officials, it may be said, is
substantially different from its power to interfere with the internal operations of another state. This brings us to the second
argument, that Tarble's Case was simply an incorrect decision and
should be rejected. The entire basis of the Madisonian Compromise was that state courts would always be open to hear cases
not given by Congress to the federal courts. 225 The Supreme
Court has recognized that the supremacy clause 22 6 requires state
227
courts to enforce federal statutory and constitutional rights.
Tarble's Case, it might be argued, is thus in direct opposition to
both the Madisonian Compromise and the supremacy clause as
interpreted by more recent Supreme Court decisions. If Congress feels there is substantial danger of state interference with
federal programs in specific instances, the argument proceeds, it
can simply legislate to exclude state judicial review.
at least the potential exercise of habeas corpus power by the state courts. However, as
developed more clearly below, see text accompanying note 253 infra, the external assumption of the framers that state courts would be available is at no point contained in the
body of the Constitution and merely represents the prevalent philosophy of federalism at
the time. Tarble's Case, in denying state court power to exercise habeas corpus against
federal officials, does not disregard the dictates of the Constitution. Rather, it merely
rejects the external philosophy of federalism, which changed gradually from the time of
the framers, and then drastically after the Civil War, to contemplate virtually no state
power to interfere with the federal government.
225 Text accompanying note 58 supra.
226 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
227 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). At least one commentator, however, has
recently questioned whether Testa was intended to impose an obligation on state courts
under the supremacy clause to hear constitutional as well as statutory claims:
First, the Testa doctrine and cases which have adopted it arose under remedial,
penal, or criminal statutes. The Supreme Court has not indicated whether the
doctrine is properly applicable to suits arising directly under constitutional provisions, and it is not clear that Testa would extend to an area so heavily imbued
with a uniquely federal interest. Second, Testa can be read as allowing reversal of
a state court decision declining jurisdiction over a case arising under federal law
only if the state's refusal is for discriminatory reasons.
Weinberger, The JurisdictionalAmount Requirement of Section 1331 in Suits Against Federal
Officers: Due Process Tensions, 46 COLO. L. REV. 157, 204 (1974).
On the other hand, although Testa dealt with a statutory cause of action, its broad
language seems to imply that the supremacy clause's dictate applies to constitutional
actions as well. The Court cited approvingly what it called the teaching of Claflin v.
Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876), "that the Constitution and the laws passed pursuant to it
are the supreme laws of the land, binding alike upon states, courts, and the people .... "
330 U.S. at 391. As to Weinberger's second point, a state court's refusal to enforce a
federal constitutional right for the sole reason that it is a federal cause of action would
seem to be exactly the kind of discrimination in which a state may not engage.
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First of all, it should be emphasized that despite critical
commentary 2 28 the Court has shown no indication that it plans to
reject Tarble's Case. And, of course, as long as Tarble's Case rightly
or wrongly stands, the analysis of Congress' power to limit federal court jurisdiction described here retains validity. More importantly, the inadvisability of the decision in Tarble's Case is by
no means clear.
In a sense, Tarble's Case represents the culmination of a
struggle between the forces supporting widespread state
sovereignty and those in favor of a strong and supreme national
government, a struggle which climaxed in the Civil War. Almost
immediately after the union began as a two-sovereign entity, the
adequacy of state courts as forums for shaping the young nation
came under question. 229 As the sense of federalism grew into the
view of a necessarily strong, centralized government, the basic
underpinning of the Madisonian Compromise started to erode.
Early problems arose concerning state interference in federal
matters in cases such as McCulloch v. Maryland230 and peaked in
McClung v. Silliman.23 1 The question whether state courts should
be permitted to wield power and take an active role in federal
policy-making was only one facet of the basic conflict between
those who believed that the fundamental power should lie in the
states and those who believed it should lie in the national government. The conflict reached its height in the 1850's in cases
such as Ex Parte Pleasant's,2 32 Ableman v. Booth,2 33 and Passmore
Williamson's Case.234 Then, finally, came the inevitable resolution:
the Civil War.
Various cases arose during the conflict involving state court
intervention in federal affairs.2 35 After the War, Congress
228

See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 427-28; Arnold, supra note 169, at
1390-91.
229 See Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345, 347-59
(1930).
230 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
22! 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821); see text accompanying notes 176-84supra.
23219 F. Cas. 864 (No. 11,225) (C.C.D.C. 1833). See generally Warren, supra note 229,
at 355.
235 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858). See text accompanying notes 187-93 supra. See
generally Warren, supra note 229, at 355.
234 26 Pa. 9 (1855). See generally Warren, supra note 229, at 355.
233See generally H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR
AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION (1973). The state court interference occurred on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line both before and during the war:
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enacted vast amounts of legislation of various kinds and constitutional amendments which promoted the supremacy of the federal government. 236 There was a new atmosphere surrounding
state-federal relations. 237 In this post-war atmosphere the SuLawsuits lodged in states' courts against national military and civil security, conscription, and revenue officers accentuated the most worrisome aspect of these
conditions ....
Other times, when despite writs from state judges to release
individuals, national officers persisted in an arrest or imprisonment or retained
alleged minors in the Army, state contempt citations were issued against them.
Noncomplying national officers faced prison and money fines .... Defendants
included cabinet Secretaries Cameron, Seward and Stanton, as well as Army
lieutenants. Suits against the latter were especially shrewd hits. Few junior officers could shrug off threats of heavy fines, and none wished to suffer imprisonment.
Id. 240-41. Hyman tells of one such situation. A Kansas state judge issued a writ against
the United States Army and the commanding officer of the garrison at Fort Leavenworth. When the commanding officer refused to appear before the court on the ground
that the court lacked jurisdiction, the judge threatened to hold him in contempt and
ordered the state militia to arrest him. The commanding officer thereupon called for
federal reinforcements. Calmer tempers ruled the situation, however, and a dangerous
clash between the United States Army and "loyal" state militia was avoided. Id. 363-64.
236 Hyman points out:

The result of such reactions was legislation, beginning with the March 3,
1863 habeas-corpus-indemnity-removal law, that in Frankfurter's and Landis's
estimate made the Civil War and Reconstruction "a turning point in the history
of the federal judiciary." Thereafter, between 1863 and 1875, successive Congresses wove the federal courts more intimately than ever before "into the history of the times."
Even today, when lawmen have scholarly resources available virtually undreamed of a century ago, the improved allocation of jurisdiction between national and state courts is an enormously difficult technical task and a tender
political assignment. In the midst of the Civil War, the Lincoln Administration
felt impelled to examine, for the first time since 1789, basic nation-state court
jurisdictional divisions. Lincoln's lawmakers achieved a remarkable improvement in the harmony and utility of the federal courts.
H. HYMAN, supra note 235, at 242.
237 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88 (1971). Professor Fairman states:
When Tarble's Case arose the entire matter of State-federal relations was moving
into a new setting. The Fourteenth Amendment had just been adopted: national
citizenship was made primary; States were bound under federal sanction to
accord a wide but as yet not precisely defined body of rights to the individual.
Id. 1425.
See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1928):
The Civil War gave impulse to . . . powerful new economic forces; it also
released political ideas of nationalism no less important in their practical consequences. The supremacy of national authority, the extension of federal activities, the resort to federal agencies, were vindicated both in theory and practice to the mind of the dominant North. The Federal Government not the
individual states had won the war.
Id. 57. For a general discussion of the wide variety of federal legislation emanating from
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preme Court handed down its decision in Tarble's Case, which
represented another manifestation of the prevalent philosophy
of government relations over which a war had been fought. As
Professor Warren views this period,
Until the Civil War, there was a steady and impartial
promotion of this policy of non-interference between
federal and state courts. Since 1875, and the broad extension of jurisdiction vested by the Judiciary Act of
that year, the decisions of the Supreme Court, in cases
of inter-judicial clash, have shown somewhat
of a trend
2 38
towards upholding the federal courts.
In addition to the changed opinion of the state courts' role
in federal policy-making, the feeling of initial distrust that many
framers had toward a centralized government and its judicial
power underwent change. As one commentator states:
The jealousy with which the States at first regarded
the national government has, to a large extent, passed
away. The facilities of intercommunication have removed inconveniences which in early days attended
litigation in the Federal courts. The mutual relations
between the State and Federal courts have come to be
regarded as the subject of critical and scientific study
rather than of partisan or local debate.2 3 9
And this, he asserts, results in the view that
there is not now any substantial difference of opinion as
to the desirability of giving the Federal courts power to
bring every subject relating to the functions of the Federal government, and the performance of their duties
by Federal officers, in the first
instance within the juris240
diction of the Federal courts.

the experience of the Civil War and its theoretical underpinnings, see id. 57-102.
Another commentator states:
42 U.S.C. § 1983 was passed in the post Civil War era when a new structure of
law was emerging to establish the role of the federal government as a "guarantor
of basic federal rights against state power." The legislators believed that the state
courts, particularly in the South, were not enforcing these rights, and were even

being used to harass and injure individuals.
Note, 1974 WXs. L. REV. 1180, 1182 (footnotes omitted).

Warren, supra note 229, at 345.
239 Bishop, supra note 169, at 417-18.
240
Id. 418.
238
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The philosophy of federalism had thus shifted dramatically from
the time of the Madisonian Compromise. The federal government had become clearly supreme in all respects, and as a result
state court power4 1to regulate the actions of federal officers was
2
severely limited.
There is no reason to think that the total federal supremacy
established after the Civil War has lost vitality under current
conditions. Perhaps the southern civil rights cases discussed
above 24 2 most dramatically point up the modern soundness of
the reasoning in Tarble's Case. State judges who are either unfamiliar with or antagonistic to federal programs, especially if
they are at the lower levels of the state judicial system, may do
2 43
much to disrupt and injure federal schemes of national scope.
241 In what may seem somewhat of a paradox, another manifestation of pre-Civil
War states' rights was the insistence by many state advocates that state courts could not be
required to adjudicate federal causes of action. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); Note,
State Enforcement of Federally Created Rights, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1551, 1552 (1960). The
tension involved in Ableman and Tarble's Case, on the other hand, was with state court
attempts to enforce federal constitutional rights against federal officers. Though as a
technical matter this seems to represent a contradiction in state attitudes, as a practical
and political matter both state positions represent a consistent attitude of defiance to total
federal supremacy.
In Testa, the Supreme Court held that "the fundamental issues over the extent of
federal supremacy had been resolved by war." 330 U.S. at 390. Hence in most cases, state
courts would be required to enforce federal rights. The "federal supremacy" of Testa may
seem to contradict the federal supremacy of Tarble's Case: The former appears to require
state courts to enforce federal statutory and constitutional rights; the latter prohibits state
courts from enforcing constitutional rights against federal officers. Yet here, too, the
consistency is more practical than technical. Both doctrines evince the shift in the
philosophy of federalism that culminated after the Civil War: total federal supremacy.
State courts are not to be permitted to interfere with federal programs, either by refusing to enforce federal rights where the federal government has so directed, or by directly
controlling the actions of federal officers. The facts of Testa, it should be noted, in no way
involved an attempt by a state court to control directly the actions of federal officials.
242 See text accompanying notes 209-13 and note 213 supra.
243 One commentator proposes a "compatability test" to be applied to cases in which
state courts seek to assume jurisdiction over federal officers. Note, The Constitutional
Implications of the JurisdictionalAmount Provision in Injunction Suits Against Federal Officers,
71 COLUM. L. REV. 1474, 1486 (1974). Believing that concurrent state court jurisdiction
must be "admitted," the commentator also recognizes that the "danger of hostility within
states to a particular federal affirmation" must be "ameliorated." Id. Calling for an infusion of "flexibility" into the situation, he proposes a formulation that "attempts to balance
the conflicting needs involved, with each specific determination of jurisdiction based
upon whether the exercise of state authority would produce a demonstrable incompatibility with some substantial federal policy. In case of such incompatibility, federal exclusivity
would necessarily be implied." Id.
Although commendable, this test is unworkable in a practical sense. Any balancing
test would prove to be vague and unpredictable in operation. Furthermore, the danger
that Tarble's Case was concerned with would still exist. A strict rule prohibiting state court
interference in federal affairs would be much more workable.
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Application of Tarble's Case effectively prevents this potential for
harm.
It is true that if Congress really desired, it could, in enacting
a federal scheme, make clear that jurisdiction to review the acts
of federal officers executing the legislation is to be vested exclusively in the federal courts. In light of the potential danger inherent in state court power to enjoin federal officers, however, it
would seem reasonable to expect Congress to make an affirmative assertion permitting state court jurisdiction if it concludes
that the interests of federalism do not demand a limitation on
state power in a particular case. 244 Tarble's Case can thus be read
to create a presumption that state courts, under the supremacy
clause, are powerless to control directly the actions of federal
officers. This presumption, premised on the practical realities
and fundamental philosophy of our federal system, can be overcome only by a carefully considered, conscious decision by Congress that, in a specific area, state court power over the actions of
federal officers is permissible.
Viewing Tarble's Case as currently good law appropriately
"organizes" the federal system in two ways. First, it eliminates the
potential for undue interference with broad federal programs by
245
state judges of limited perspective or antagonistic motives.
244 Tarble's Case is not clear whether state court jurisdiction would have been valid
had Congress specifically authorized it. However, if Congress has made an explicit determination that state court control presents no danger to the execution of its programs it
would seem that no interest in federal supremacy would be served by judicial preclusion
of state court power.
245 It is true, of course, that federal as well as state judges might improperly disrupt
the delicate workings of a federal program. The danger is considerably less, however, for
several reasons. First, since federal judges are selected by the President and approved by
the Senate, the federal government possesses substantial power to assure a floor of
competency in the federal courts, something which is obviously not the case in the
appointment of state judges. Second, because of the broad experience they obtain in
working day to day with problems of predominantly federal concern, federal judges may
well have a broader perspective than many of their colleagues on the state bench and
may be more sensitive to interests of federal concern. See Meltsner, Southern Appellate
Courts: A Dead End, in SOUTHERN JUSTICE 136, 137-38 (L. Friedman ed. 1965):

State judges who wish to remain in office and to retain the society of their
fellows... do not officially recognize the social consequences to the region and
the nation of maintaining serfdom in place of slavery. They have shown a
shocking eagerness to avoid even the appearance of fairness ....
Compare Fingerhood, The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in SOUTHERN JUSTICE 214 (L.
Friedman ed. 1965), with J. PELTASON, Ftrn'-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL

(1961). See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 163-68

JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

(1969).
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Second, it logically leads to the conclusion, advocated here, that
certain limitations on federal court jurisdiction .are unconstitutional, thus preserving the presumably more qualified and better
equipped 46 federal courts to protect the constitutional rights of
private individuals against attack by the federal government.
2. The Limits of the New Synthesis
It is important at this point to sort out exactly how far this
"new synthesis," premised on the continued vitality of Tarble's
Case, impinges on Congress' power to limit the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts. It may be helpful in this context to contrast
our approach, in both practical and theoretical terms, with the
implications of the "changing circumstances" theory described
earlier.2 47 The approach taken here would hold unconstitutional
a congressional limitation on lower federal court jurisdiction
only in situations involving two elements. First, a constitutional
challenge must be involved; 24 and second, that challenge must
be one that would result in a direct judicial command such as
injunction, mandamus, or habeas corpus, controlling the actions
of a federal officer or agent. The primary area of constitutional
cases not covered by this approach, then, is that involving actions
of state or local officials. Thus, for example, if Congress were to
enact a statute precluding federal judicial review of local ordinances prohibiting school busing to attain racial integration, the
approach advocated here would not prevent that result, for
without the limits of Tarble's Case and its progeny state courts are
under a duty to enforce federal constitutional rights249 and thus
the federal legislation would not have deprived a litigant of an
independent judicial forum. State court exercise of power in
2 50
such a case would not interfere with federal officials.
Third, the decisions of a federal district judge may be immediately stayed and/or
reviewed by a higher federal court. Actions of state judges, on the other hand, must first
be taken through the entire state judicial system before there is an opportunity for
federal review, and even at that point the review can come only from the Supreme Court
(assuming it is not a matter that can be dealt with collaterally by the federal courts, such
as habeas corpus).
246 See note 245 supra.
'47 Text accompanying notes 101-41 supra.
248 Note 142 supra.
249 Cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
210 A different case would exist, of course, if Congress placed the task of busing
school children under the supervision of federal officials.
It is conceivable that the logic of Tarble's Case and its progeny should be extended to
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The "changing circumstances" theory, on the other hand,
would remove Congress' power to limit federal court jurisdiction
even in the busing hypothetical. 51 Perhaps if we were writing on
a clean slate, we could accept this result. After all, as noted
previously, it seems eminently reasonable to have federal courts
adjudicate federal constitutional rights. But we are obviously not
writing on a clean slate, and to argue that the courts can openly
disregard the all too clear dictates of article III simply because
they now find the effect of that provision ill-advised is to set an
extremely dangerous precedent in the area of constitutional interpretation. There will undoubtedly be occasions where courts
will, in the opinion of many, incorrectly reject as ill-advised in
modern society many of our fundamental constitutional principles. If we are to permit judicial repeal of the Constitution in
certain cases, it becomes intellectually awkward to deny that
power in others. 5 2
preclude state judicial review of any federal legislation, regardless of whether or not a
federal official is enjoined as a result. After all, if the concern of the Court in Tarble's Case
was that state courts might violate the "new" post-Civil War federal supremacy by disrupting federal programs, it could be argued that the same danger applies to state
judicial review of all federal legislation. However, the most substantial interference
clearly is direct control of the actions of federal officers in carrying out federal programs.
In any event, the federal courts do not appear to have accepted this extension of the logic
of Tarble's Case. Thus, rightly or wrongly, in cases where there exists no danger of
enjoining or otherwise directly interfering with the actions of a federal official the state
courts remain open. Hence under the logic of our position, congressional limitations of
lower federal court jurisdiction in such situations would not violate the fifth amendment.
251 It is important to note that our theory will limit Congress' power in certain
instances where Eisenberg's "changing circumstances" theory would not. Recall that
Eisenberg recognized what we consider a logically questionable exemption for congressional limitations which are "neutral" in their motivation. Text accompanying notes
129-34 supra. Thus he would allow the $10,000 jurisdictional minimum in federal question cases, even if its application prevented a claim for the deprivation of constitutional
rights by federal officials from being brought in federal court. Under our theory, such an
application of the jurisdictional amount requirement would be unconstitutional. Accord,
Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972); Note, 34 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 171, 174
(1965). But see Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (dictum).
252 Although the point has been made previously, see note 128 supra and accompanying text, it is of such significance that it is worth reemphasizing: We are not arguing that
a court's interpretation of a constitutional provision can never be influenced by changing
conditions. On the contrary, if we are to keep the concepts of "cruel and unusual
punishment" or "due process" viable in modern society, we must constantly reevaluate
their definitions. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). But in doing so, we are rejecting neither the fundamental broad dictates nor the language of the constitutional provision, as does the
"changing circumstances" approach with respect to article III. Unlike the constitutional
provisions referred to above, the language and intent of article III are narrowly drawn,
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Of course, it might be argued that the approach described
here disregards the framers' clear intent just as flagrantly as does
the "changing circumstances" theory. The historical evidence
appears fairly well established that the framers' fundamental assumption in drafting article III was that the state courts would
always remain open to hear federal claims. Yet the synthesis here
is premised on a significant limitation on that assumption: the
radical change in political philosophy toward a strong centralized
national government which took place in the interval between
the drafting of article III and the post-Civil War era.25 3
But there exists a fundamental distinction between this
theory and Eisenberg's. Eisenberg's "changing circumstances"
theory rejects the clear dictate of article III that Congress has the
discretion to create or abolish the lower federal courts. The limitation urged here is based on a recognition of the radical change
in political philosophy that occurred after the drafting of article
III. Though the availability of a state forum was an assumption
of the framers, nothing in article III-or any other constitutional
provision, for that matter-specifically provides that the state
courts must remain open to hear all federal claims. Hence no
constitutional provision is being disregarded merely because it
no longer seems advisable. Only an assumption of the framers
external to the Constitution is being rejected because it is inconsistent with acceptable modern political thought. So long as that
assumption was not placed in the body of the Constitution, we
are no more bound by it today than we are by the dictates of the
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, authored by two of the most
respected framers, Madison and Jefferson.
thus effectively precluding the kind of "modernizing" analysis for which the others are so
well suited.
253 This radical change in political philosophy is demonstrated by the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions passed by the legislatures of the respective states in 1798. The
Kentucky Resolution was written by Thomas Jefferson and its Virginia counterpart by
James Madison. Both were written in response to the passage of the Alien and Sedition
Acts by the Federalist dominated Congress. The problems considered in the documents,
however, were much wider in scope, relating to the very nature of the federal system of
government. A major question addressed in the resolutions concerned who was to judge
whether the central government was overstepping its rightful powers. The Resolutions,
in varying degrees, advocated that the states should be the final judges. In later years,
these resolutions were used as support for the doctrines of states' rights and nullification,
particularly by John Calhoun. Many, including Calhoun, erroneously considered the
resolutions to be part of the Constitution and to have legal authority. See generally A.
MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 272-81 (1935); E.
WARFIELD, THE KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS OF 1798 (1887).
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Once we reject the external assumption of the Madisonian
Compromise to the limited extent recognized by Tarble's Case,
the limitation on Congress' power to restrict lower federal court
jurisdiction flows not from our rejection of article III because of
its modern inadvisability, but rather from the dictates of the fifth
amendment's due process clause, which requires an independent
judicial forum for the adjudication of constitutional rights. In
this manner we have avoided the potentially harmful effects on
methods of constitutional interpretation that could result from
use of the "changing circumstances" theory.
The limitations on judicial jurisdiction discussed to this
point are those directed by Congress solely at the lower federal
courts. Complications arise when Congress has precluded any
court, federal or state, from reviewing the constitutionality of
certain actions.2 5 4 When the subject of the limitation concerns
activities of federal officers, the analysis would logically not differ from the situations previously discussed: Due process requires an independent judicial forum, and even if Congress had
not explicitly limited state court jurisdiction, Tarble's Case would
have yielded the same result. Thus as in the previous situations,
Congress' limit on the jurisdiction of the federal courts would
fall, and Tarble's Case would leave the limitation on state court
jurisdiction intact.
In cases where the congressional limitation does not concern
judicial control of the acts of federal agents, however, a dual
congressional preclusion of both federal and state court jurisdiction would present very different problems. As noted previously,
the dual limitation is unconstitutional for failing to provide an
independent judicial forum. Thus one of the two limitations
must fall; but which one? The Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
25 5
faced with such a problem in Battaglia v. General Motors Corp.
in regard to the constitutionality of the Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947,256 concluded that because due process required an independent judicial forum the congressional limitation on the
federal courts must fall. However, if in ruling upon the constitutionality of the Act a state court would not be in any way enjoin-

2354
See, e.g., Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, § 204(d), 29 U.S.C. § 252(d) (1970).

2

169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948).

256 29 U.S.C. § 252(d) (1970).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 124:45

ing or otherwise ordering a federal officer or agent, 257 there
would appear to be no reason why the dictates of the Madisonian
Compromise could not be given effect. Thus where Congress
has precluded both federal and state judicial review, in situations
where there is no danger of directly controlling the acts of federal officials, a logical conclusion would be that since Congress
has complete power to limit federal court jurisdiction under article III, it is, under the Madisonian Compromise, the limitation
on the state courts which should fall. This is so for the framers
clearly gave Congress the power to limit lower federal court
jurisdiction. If the subject matter excluded from judicial review
does not involve the actions of federal officers, the state courts
are not prevented by the logic of Tarble's Case from reviewing the
federal legislation. Hence, since Congress was given power to
limit federal court jurisdiction precisely because the state courts
would be available to hear federal claims, the dictates of due
process can be reconciled most effectively with the terms of the
Madisonian Compromise by the conclusion that the limit on the
state rather than on the federal courts must fall.
One further potentially severe limitation on the reach of the
new synthesis derives from the fact, noted earlier, that Congress
can probably circumvent the difficulties created by Tarble's Case
by explicitly authorizing state court jurisdiction over the acts of
federal officials. Thus if Congress truly desired to preclude
lower federal court jurisdiction, it could avoid constitutional
problems by authorizing state court review in those cases.
This fact does not mean, however, that judicial recognition
and adoption of the new synthesis would have no effect on possible congressional limitations on lower federal court jurisdiction.
When Congress consciously attempts to exclude federal court
review of a particular area of the law, it often intends to exclude
all forms of judicial review, both state and federal. Recognition
of a due process right to an independent judicial forum would,
of course, prohibit such a result. Absent the new synthesis' emphasis on the role of Tarble's Case, it would seem logical that it be
the state rather than the federal courts which would retain their
jurisdiction. If the dictates of due process can be followed without disregarding the requirements of article III, such a reconciliation should be achieved. Because of Tarble's Case and its
2-1

This appears to have been the case in Battaglia. See note 250 supra.
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progeny, however, the state courts must remain closed in cases in
which the acts of federal officials would be subject to direct judicial regulation, at least absent explicit congressional authorization. Thus, in cases in which Congress has attempted to preclude
all forms of judicial review of the actions of federal officials,
adoption of the new synthesis would result in federal, rather
than state, jurisdiction.
Secondly, judicial recognition of the new synthesis would
probably deter congressional limitations on the jurisdiction of
federal courts. Often when Congress considers adoption of limits
on the powers of the lower federal courts it is likely that little
thought is given to possible denials of due process. This is especially true, one might suppose, for what Eisenberg calls "neutral"
housekeeping regulations, such as the jurisdictional amount prerequisite to general federal question jurisdiction.2 58 Under the
new synthesis, Congress, in passing such legislation, would be
required to provide explicitly for a state forum to hear constitutional claims involving the direct control of federal officials.
Congress would thus be made aware of two important considerations: (1) the legislation in question presents serious constitutional problems, and (2) the only way to avoid these problems is
to entrust to the competence of the state courts the power to
control federal officials directly and perhaps even to frustrate
numerous federal programs. 25 9 Indeed, not even the protection
of potential removal to the federal courts would be available
since the purpose of Congress' action has been specifically to
preclude federal review. Awareness of these considerations
would hopefully do much to deter such congressional limitations. Absent the new synthesis, however, we could not be assured that Congress would even be aware of the dangers in such
jurisdictional limitations.
Of course, Congress may at times be all too well aware of the
258

Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 516; see text accompanying notes 129-41. It appears

that in increasing the jurisdictional amount requirement from $3,000 to $10,000 in
1958, Congress was unaware that constitutional claims against federal officers fell
within the general federal question statute. S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1958). Thus, section 1331, as applied to suits to restrain unconstitutional conduct of
federal officers, is clearly susceptible to attack under the new synthesis.
259 Congress could, we suppose, simply pass a statute authorizing state court review
of all actions of federal officers. But, primarily because of the policy arguments discussed
earlier concerning the inherent dangers of state court control of federal officers, passage
of such a statute is almost inconceivable.
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effects of jurisdictional limitations on the lower federal courts
and the entrusting of jurisdiction to the state courts. Congress
might, for example, grant jurisdiction to the state rather than
the federal courts to prevent findings of fact which might be
more favorable to one or the other litigant when the federal
court is the trial forum. Thus, since the new synthesis does not
question the motives of Congress in denying original jurisdiction
to the federal courts, Congress might well decide, for example,
to deny the federal courts original jurisdiction in all school desegregation cases so as to entrust the state courts with a broad
power, as finders of fact, to determine the presence of de jure
segregation subject only to Supreme Court reversal in the event
that the findings are completely against the weight of the evidence. (Indeed, were Congress to deny the federal courts original jurisdiction in school desegregation cases, it would not even
be necessary to specify that the state courts have such jurisdiction
since Tarble's Case would not apply to such state actions unless,
possibly, federal funds were involved.) The problem is real; but
the solution, if any, must lie in a constitutional amendment and
not in a "changing circumstances" interpretation of the Constitution.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Congress clearly doeg not enjoy unfettered control over
lower federal court jurisdiction. Rather, in exercising its otherwise plenary article III powers, it is restricted from withdrawing
the jurisdiction of lower federal courts to hear suits seeking direct control of federal officers. Article III's apparent grant of
complete discretion over lower federal court jurisdiction must be
read in light of the fifth amendment's guarantee of due process
and the fundamental change in the philosophy of federalism
that took place following the Civil War.
The compromise underlying the drafting of article III does
not require discarding the Supreme Court's decision in Tarble's
Case. Rather, the compromise must be considered in light of the
developments during the first seventy years of the Republic and
the change in the philosophy of state-federal relations. Tarble's
Case represents one of many manifestations of the philosophy
favoring a strong, centralized national government free from
unwarranted state interference.
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By using Tarble's Case as an offensive weapon, lower federal
courts can check congressional control of their jurisdiction. In
this way they will be able to provide a federal forum for the
proper resolution of certain constitutional claims involving federal statutes. Though Congress can, if it truly desires, circumvent the limits imposed by the combination of Tarble's Case and
the fifth amendment, the elements of the new synthesis
nevertheless do place obstacles in Congress' path, forcing Congress to comprehend the true consequences of its acts. In situations where Congress has attempted to limit all judicial review of
the acts of federal officers and in those where Congress has
failed to provide explicitly for state court review, the new synthesis forces cases into federal rather than state court. This result
may prove insufficient to those who would hope to circumvent
completely Congress' power to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. But it is, quite frankly, the most that can be obtained
within the rational bounds of article III; and though greater
restrictions on congressional power might be preferred as a policy matter, the achievements of the new synthesis should not be
underestimated.

